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I. INTRODUCTION
In concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
right of same-sex couples to marry, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges was avowedly non-originalist in
its promotion of the idea that changing societal norms can lead to
the evolution of constitutional meaning.1 But if the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment had been the Court’s
guide, would it have concluded that state bans on same-sex
marriage are unconstitutional? To Justice Scalia, the answer was
clear: “When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,” he
reasoned, “every State limited marriage to one man and one
woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That
resolves these cases.”2
But asking how the framers of the Amendment would have
answered the specific question about same-sex marriage, had it
been put to them, is not the only plausible way to address the
question of the Amendment’s original meaning. We could instead
ask whether the framers understood the Amendment to protect a
fundamental right to marry, abstracting out the particular status
or identity of the two people who seek to exercise the right. Or we
could ask whether the Amendment would objectively have been
understood to incorporate a principle prohibiting all “caste-like”
discrimination,3 which in turn would necessitate consideration of
whether discrimination against gays and lesbians is such a form of
discrimination (which we might answer either in light of or in
spite of the framers’ intuitions about that question). Or we could
ask whether the Amendment’s original objective meaning was to
mandate “equality,” an objectively capacious concept that might
forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation today, even
if it would not have in 1868.4

1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The generations that wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the
extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”).
2 Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 See infra notes 169–182 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 172–177 and accompanying text.
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Whether originalism requires the conclusion that bans on samesex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment depends on
which of these questions we ask. (And these questions, it turns
out, are just a few of the many plausible ways to frame the
inquiry.) The lower the level of generality at which we ask the
question—for example, did the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believe (or intend or expect) that the Amendment
would prohibit bans on same-sex marriage—the more likely it is
that the answer will be that bans on same-sex marriage are
consistent with the original meaning. And the higher the level of
generality at which we ask the question—for example, did the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporate an “anti-caste” principle, or
did the Fourteenth Amendment require “equality” more
generally—the more likely it is that the answer will be that bans
on same-sex marriage are inconsistent with the original meaning.
The same is true for other contested questions of constitutional
law. Did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understand it
to prohibit laws interfering with a woman’s right to use birth
control or to obtain an abortion? Almost certainly not. But would
a hypothetical, reasonable, well-informed person in 1868 have
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to offer protection for
personal autonomy in matters of family and child rearing? Likely
so. And that broadly (and vaguely) defined right, when applied to
specific circumstances in a modern context, might embrace (and
therefore protect) the decision about whether to use contraception
or to obtain an abortion. The selection of the level of generality at
which we ask the question essentially foreordains the answer.5
We could go through this exercise for the permissibility of racebased
affirmative
action
by
state
institutions;6
the
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate expenditures designed

5 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 358
(1992) (“Movements in the level of constitutional generality may be used to justify almost
any outcome.”).
6 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit the law school’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further
a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body.”).
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to influence the outcomes of elections;7 and countless other
controversial questions of constitutional law.
It is, of course, not universally accepted that the appropriate
inquiry, in determining constitutional meaning, is to seek the
document’s original meaning.8 But even if there were broad
agreement that the proper way to interpret the Constitution is to
seek its original meaning, constitutional questions would be
heavily contested because we would have to decide whether to seek
that meaning at a high level of specificity or, conversely, at a high
level of generality.
Yet the Constitution does not give any clear guidance about
how to decide the correct level of generality at which to read its
provisions.9 Instead, originalists must have a theory about how to
select the correct level of generality for ascertaining constitutional
meaning.
The “old originalism”—that is, the original-intent originalism of
Edwin Meese, Raoul Berger, and (originally) Robert Bork—tended
to have such a theory, even if its proponents did not always apply
it with perfect consistency.10 Notwithstanding the broad terms in
which many of the Constitution’s rights-granting provisions are
framed, the old originalism generally sought constitutional
meaning at a low level of generality.11 Proponents of the old
originalism contended that it was simply implausible to believe
that the framers intended to authorize unelected judges to find, in
the Constitution’s vague and open-ended provisions, specific rights

7 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“No
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of non-profit or forprofit corporations.”).
8 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852 (1989)
(“[O]riginalism is not, and had perhaps never been, the sole method of constitutional
exegesis.”).
9 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The selection of a level of generality
necessarily involves value choices.”).
10 See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599
(2004) (noting the prominence of the old originalism in the 1960s through the 1980s).
11 See Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 350, 352–53 (1988) (criticizing as illegitimate any effort to “read general words in
disregard of the specific intention[s]”); id. at 351.
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not explicitly mentioned in the text.12 This approach usually
resolved claims of constitutional rights against the existence of the
right;13 if the question, after all, is whether the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment (or the Fifth Amendment) specifically
intended the Constitution to protect the right of a woman to use
contraception or to obtain an abortion, for example, the question
pretty much answers itself.
The old originalism “was as much a normative theory of the
proper judicial role as it was a semantic theory of textual
interpretation.”14
Its primary professed commitment was to
judicial constraint—preventing judges from imposing their
personal policy preferences under the guise of interpretation—and
judicial restraint—requiring judges, in most cases, to defer to
legislative majorities.15 The old originalism tended to advance
these goals, at least in theory, by limiting the circumstances under
which judges could displace the decisions of democratically
accountable actors.16 If constitutional rights are defined more
narrowly, then there is less opportunity for judges to invalidate
government action in the name of individual rights. And the old
originalism, which erred strongly on the side of declining to find
specific rights in the Constitution’s broadly worded rights-granting
provisions, not surprisingly would have resulted in a more narrow
range of protected rights.17
But as an approach for ascertaining constitutional meaning, the
old originalism suffered from serious problems, both theoretical
and practical. Given the number of potential “framers” (itself an
12 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 116–31 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 180–85 (1990).
13 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (“Above all, originalism was a way of explaining
what the Court had done wrong, and what it had done in this context was primarily to
strike down government actions in the name of individual rights.”).
14 See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 10, at 602; Thomas B. Colby & Peter J.
Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 156–59 (2015).
15 See Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 584–85 (noting old originalism’s commitment to
judicial restraint and judicial deference to the legislature); Whittington, supra note 10, at
602 (describing old originalism’s focus on limiting judicial discretion and promoting judicial
deference to the legislature).
16 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 602 (explaining that old originalists were “primarily
concerned with empowering popular majorities”).
17 See infra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
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uncertain category), it is perhaps impossible to ascertain one
single, collective intent, particularly when one seeks the subjective
intentions of the framers;18 and, in any event, given the framers’
views about interpretation, original-intent originalism likely was
self-defeating.19 The old originalism was also susceptible to the
charge that, by almost religiously adhering to the specific
preferences of men who lived long ago, it was simply a device to
impose substantively conservative values under the guise of
neutral interpretation. In addition, if original intent, defined at a
low level of generality, was the benchmark for constitutional
meaning, then the approach not only did a poor job of explaining
existing doctrine,20 but also would have led, if faithfully followed,
to untenable results—such as the conclusion that Brown v. Board
of Education21 was incorrectly decided.22
The “new originalism,”23 which ostensibly is the dominant
approach among originalists today, arose as a response to criticism
of the old originalism. Although it is difficult to generalize, given
the range of current originalist theories,24 the new originalism
generally eschews the subjective intent of the framers and instead
seeks the original, objective meaning of the constitutional text.

18 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 209–22 (1980) (discussing the difficulty of pinpointing the specific intent to
adopters); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720
(2011) (“[C]ritics charged that it is often impossible to uncover a single collective intent of
the Framers as a whole, insofar as different Framers were often motivated by different
intentions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19 See Colby, supra note 18, at 720 (“Critics also argued that original intent is a selfdefeating philosophy. The historical evidence shows that the Framers intended for future
generations not to interpret the Constitution according to the intent of the Framers; as
such, in order to follow the intent of the Framers, one must not follow the intent of the
Framers.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 948 (1984) (“It is commonly assumed that the ‘interpretive intention’ of the
Constitution's framers was that the Constitution would be construed in accordance with
what future interpreters could gather of the framers' own purposes, expectations, and
intentions. Inquiry shows that assumption to be incorrect.”).
20 See Brest, supra note 18, at 223 (“Strict originalism cannot accommodate most modern
decisions under the Bill of Rights of fourteenth amendment.”).
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 See infra notes 41–63 and accompanying text.
23 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 607–08 (examining new originalist theory).
24 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 256–62
(2009) (discussing the range of originalist theories).
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The new originalism is based in significant part on the premise
that to interpret text is, by definition, to seek the original meaning
of the text.25
It thus is as much a semantic theory of
interpretation as it is a normative theory of the judicial role.26 As
such, the new originalism is not single-mindedly driven, as was
the old originalism, by a commitment to judicial restraint. As
Keith Whittington has explained, “[t]he new originalism does not
require judges to get out of the way of legislatures. It requires
judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also
nothing less.”27 In contrast to the old originalism, the “primary
virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of constitutional
fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic majoritarianism.”28
As a consequence, many new originalists have abandoned the old
originalism’s refusal to acknowledge the possibility that the
Constitution ought to be read at a high level of abstraction. After
all, if fidelity to the original meaning of the text, rather than
judicial restraint, is the operative principle, then we might have to
interpret provisions that are written in objectively broad terms to
have a broad sweep and application. Accordingly, new originalists
do not insist that we should always seek constitutional meaning at
the lowest possible level of generality, by reference to the specific
expectations of the framers.
But in accepting that not every question of constitutional law
can be resolved by seeking the specific understanding of the
framers at the lowest possible level of generality, the new
originalism creates a significant problem: once the new originalist

25 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823,
1825–26 (1997) (“[T]he presumptive meaning of a [document] is its original public
meaning.”).
26 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series No. 07-24, Nov. 2008, at 30 (“What words mean is one thing; what
we should do about their meaning is another.”).
27 Whittington, supra note 10, at 609.
28 Id. See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table,”
and “it is . . . the role of th[e] Court” to enforce those rights, as originally understood,
against modern legislative interference); Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No
Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1551, 1562 (2012) (arguing that true originalism does “not worry about judicial restraint”).
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departs from the lowest level of generality, how does she decide at
which level of generality to seek constitutional meaning?
Most of the new originalists who have addressed the question
have concluded that the appropriate inquiry is to seek the level of
generality at which the text of a constitutional provision would
have been objectively understood by the reasonable, hypothetical
observer at the time that the provision was adopted.29 Because
many of the most contested provisions of the Constitution—
including the central rights-granting clauses—are framed in
broad, abstract terms, this approach inevitably should lead the
originalist to seek the original meaning of those provisions at a
high level of generality.30 And because the original meaning at a
high level of generality cannot, by itself, resolve most contested
questions of constitutional law today, many new originalists have
contended that we must instead engage in the process of
“construction”—the creation of rules of decision that are
“consistent with” the original meaning, “but not deducible from
it.”31 On most accounts, construction necessarily requires judicial
creativity to apply the Constitution’s broad commands to concrete
circumstances, as it is a process that, by definition, is “outside the

29 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 488 (2007) (“But if what matters to us is the original meaning of the text,
then the principles underlying the constitutional text should be as general as the text
itself.”); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 644
(1999) (“[D]etermining original meanings entails determining the level of generality with
which a particular term was used.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of
Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 23 (2006) (“[O]riginal public meaning
originalism attempts to identify the level of generality in which the Constitution is
objectively expressed.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1269, 1280 (1997) (“A genuine commitment to the semantic intentions of the
Framers requires the interpreter to seek the level of generality at which the particular
language was understood by the its Framers.”).
30 See McConnell, supra note 29, at 1281 (“It is perfectly possible that . . . the interpreter
would discover that some provisions of the Constitution were understood at a high level of
generality . . . .”); Whittington, supra note 10, at 611 (noting that the founders may have
intended abstract principles that left discretion to future decision makers).
31 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 121 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING]; see also Randy E. Barnett,
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 257, 265 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping Precedent].
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domain of originalism as a theory of constitutional
interpretation.”32
The new originalism addresses many of the theoretical flaws of
the old originalism, but only by creating the very problem that the
old originalism was designed to address. The old originalism
purported to prevent the unconstrained judicial creativity that can
follow from seeking the original meaning of the Constitution’s
provisions at a high level of generality. But because many new
originalists recognize that many of the Constitution’s most
important provisions should be understood at a high level of
generality, and approve of the process of judicial construction to
apply those general, abstract principles to concrete cases, there is
significant room for instrumental decision making.33 In addition,
if we faithfully apply this approach—ascertaining the broad
principles that underlie the constitutional text and then seeking to
apply them to problems today, often in ways that the framers

32 Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 923, 967 (2009); see BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 121 (“[C]onstitutional
construction can be constrained by original meaning while not entirely determined by
it . . . .”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 457 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Construction] (discussing the difference between
interpretation and construction); infra notes 248–254 and accompanying text. Though most
new originalists seem to acknowledge the need for construction, not all originalists writing
today agree with this modification to the old originalism. See generally John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 [hereinafter
McGinnis & Rappaport, Abstract Meaning] (criticizing those who conclude that possibly
abstract language has an abstract meaning without sufficiently considering the alternative
possibilities); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751
(2009) (advocating a theory of constitutional interpretation based on the interpretive
principles of the framers). See also Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism (UNIV. OF
SAN DIEGO SCH. OF L. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 08-0671 (2008)
(“[G]iven what we accept as legally authoritative, the proper way to interpret the
Constitution . . . is to seek its authors’ intended meanings. . . .”); Steven D. Smith, That OldTime Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 223 (2011) (Grant Hushcraft &
Bradley W. Miller eds.) (attempting a defense of old originalism). In addition, although
Keith Whittington acknowledges the need for construction, he argues that it should not be
conceived as a task for the judiciary. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION 204–06 (1999).
33 See Colby, supra note 18, at 752–64 (arguing that new originalism does not constrain
judicial decision making); Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 305 (“[O]riginalists’ claims that
originalism is likely to be overwhelmingly better than its alternatives at constraining
judicial discretion are substantially overblown.”).
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could not have anticipated—then there is no obvious distinction
between originalism and non-originalism.34
Perhaps more important, it is fair to wonder whether this
approach has been consistently and conscientiously followed;
originalists often seem to vary the level of generality at which they
seek constitutional meaning in a way that cannot be explained
simply by reference to the level of generality at which the
constitutional text is expressed. Indeed, in practice the decision
appears ad hoc, largely unconstrained, and thus susceptible to the
same kind of results-oriented decision-making that originalists
have long decried. The choice of the level of generality at which to
seek constitutional meaning—by academic originalists and,
perhaps more troubling, by judges purporting to follow an
originalist approach—varies from issue to issue and case to case,
often with no neutral principle to explain the choice. The problem
of the level of generality, in other words, has in practice
undermined the core originalist claim that it is a neutral approach
that effectively constrains the interpreter.
To be fair, this is not a problem that is unique to originalists;
non-originalists have also long grappled with the problem of
selecting a level of generality and the risk that doing so will simply
be a guise to produce desired results.35 The problem of the level of
generality in textual interpretation will be with us for as long as
we use words to capture complex ideas, with the hope that they
will apply to new and unforeseen circumstances. But it might pose
a particular problem for proponents of the new originalism, who
34 See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707 (2011).
35 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–49 (1977) (discussing the
varying approaches to interpreting vague constitutional provisions); Bruce Ackerman,
Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 318 (1992) (noting that the Court is eager to
interpret the power-granting provisions of the Constitution at a high level of abstraction
while interpreting rights-granting provisions narrowly); Paul Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,
90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091 (1981) (arguing that Bork’s adoption of a principle in interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause demands an arbitrary choice among levels of abstraction);
Brest, supra note 18, at 217 (“The extent to which a clause may be properly interpreted to
reach outcomes different from those actually contemplated by the adopters depends on the
relationship between a general principle and its exemplary applications.”); Tribe & Dorf,
supra note 9, at 1058 (“The selection of a level of generality necessarily involves value
choices.”).
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maintain, as did proponents of the old originalism, that their
approach is the only genuinely objective and neutral approach to
constitutional interpretation.36 To the extent that both the appeal
and the normative justification for originalism lies in such claims,
the new originalism’s willingness to permit judges to seek the
original meaning at a high level of generality risks significantly
undermining both the appeal and the justification for the
approach.
The problem of the level of generality is central to the challenge
that faces the new originalism, and central to understanding why
originalism cannot fulfill its promise to provide a genuinely
neutral approach to constitutional interpretation that largely
avoids the pitfalls of judicial subjectivity that are thought to infect
non-originalist approaches to interpretation.37 My objective in this
Essay is to demonstrate just how intractable the problem is. The
problem is not simply theoretical; it is practical, as the choice of
level of generality is an essential predicate to any effort to assign
meaning to the constitutional text. Accordingly, in this Essay, I
demonstrate the practical problem by providing examples of efforts
by originalists—both new, old, and in-between—to select the level
of generality when seeking to answer concrete questions of
constitutional law.
I do not seek to provide a comprehensive survey of the role that
the level of generality plays in the use and treatment of
originalism by judges and scholars. Such an effort would be
daunting; originalism has played a more prominent role in
Supreme Court decision making in recent years, largely because of
the influence of Justice Scalia, and there has been an explosion in
scholarship about originalism and scholarship seeking to apply
36 See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY (2005)) (arguing that “in principle” originalism “supplies an objective basis for
judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance,” whereas
“constitutional interpretation based on the judge’s own assessment of worthy purposes and
propitious consequences lacks that objectivity”); accord Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and
Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 286 (1996) (“Originalists
tend to ground their arguments primarily on a foundation of legitimacy.”).
37 See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2012)
(“If we are allowed to change the level of generality at which we characterize the original
understandings, then originalism can justify anything.”).

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

12

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

3/27/17 1:54 PM

[Vol. 51:1

originalist methods to specific questions of constitutional law. My
goal is more modest: to provide enough examples, from judges and
scholars professing to engage in an originalist inquiry, to make
clear that the selection of the level of generality is essential to
constitutional interpretation, yet largely unguided by any coherent
and neutral theory of selection. As it turns out, it doesn’t require
very many examples to make the case.
II. THE PROBLEM OF BROWN
I start with a doozy—originalists’ treatment of the Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.38 I begin with Brown not
because it is a typical case (far from it), but rather because it
frames perfectly the conundrum that originalists face in selecting
the appropriate level of generality at which to seek constitutional
meaning. The conventional view among legal historians has long
been that Brown cannot be reconciled with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. The evidence for
the conventional view is extensive, but for present purposes it
suffices to note the broad strokes of the argument.
Before it issued its decision, the Court in Brown requested
reargument on “the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,” including “consideration of the
Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing
practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and
opponents of the Amendment.”39 Notwithstanding the Court’s
conclusion that these sources were at best “inconclusive,”40 most of
the prominent legal historians—both those who self-identify as
originalists41 and those who do not42—who have considered the

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 489.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 119–30 (arguing that the framers did not intend to
prohibit desegregated schools); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 113 (1990) hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS] (“[T]here is no
evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to address the problem of
segregation.”); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to
Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223 (1996) [hereinafter Maltz, Originalism]
(arguing that Brown cannot be justified on originalist grounds).
38
39
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question have disagreed.43 As did the Court in Brown, they have
relied on the context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted and ratified.
First, because the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed in part
to address doubts about Congress’s authority to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, historians have focused on the meaning of that
Act to shed light on the meaning of the Amendment. An early
draft of the statute included a provision prohibiting
“discrimination in civil rights or immunities . . . on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”44 Many members of the
House and Senate objected, expressing concern that this language
might be construed to require integrated schools.45 Proponents of
the civil rights provision responded by insisting that the provision
would not prohibit segregation in public education. For example,
Representative James Wilson, who managed the bill in the House,
declared that the civil rights provision did not “mean that all
citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their children shall attend

42 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 360–61, 366 (1986); LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 12–13 (1991) (discussing Brown);
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881–83 (1995) (arguing that Brown is not
defensible on originalist grounds); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in
Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1919 (1991) (“For if Congress did not
manifest an intent to outlaw segregation, where could the Court find its authority to hold
segregation unconstitutional?” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1955) (“The history of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, to which reargument in
these [segregation] cases had been largely addressed . . . was . . . inclusive at best.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
43 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 258 n.26 (1992) (surveying the
literature and concluding that “the ‘original understanding’ on the issue of school
segregation is not genuinely in doubt”); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 951 (1995) (“Virtually nothing in the
congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit
school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation
fanciful[l].”). McConnell nevertheless argued that Brown is reconcilable with the original
meaning, but most historians have disagreed with his account. See infra notes 75–92 and
accompanying text.
44 Ronald Turner, Was “Separate but Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and
Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229, 238–39, 239 n.61 (1995).
45 See Bickel, supra note 42, at 18–20 (quoting statements by members of Congress who
objected to the Civil Rights bill).
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the same schools.”46 Such assurances, however, did not satisfy the
skeptics, and Representative John Bingham responded by
supporting a motion to strike the civil rights provision from the
bill.47 He explained that striking the provision would make the
bill “less oppressive, and therefore less objectionable,” particularly
in light of the fact that “[t]here is scarcely a State in this Union
which does not, by its constitution or by its statute laws, make
some discrimination on account of race or color between citizens of
the United States in respect of civil rights.”48 There thus is ample
evidence that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not prohibit
segregated public schools—or at least that the Members of
Congress who voted on the bill, both in support or in opposition,
did not understand it to prohibit segregation.
Second, historians have noted that congressional proponents of
the Fourteenth Amendment argued that it was designed
effectively to constitutionalize the provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Indeed, Bingham, who played a central role in
eliminating the civil rights provision from the Act of 1866, drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment and served as its primary sponsor in
the House.49 As Alexander Bickel noted, the rights-granting
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment “became the subject of
a stock generalization: it was dismissed as embodying and, in one
sense for the Republicans, in another for the Democrats and
Conservatives, ‘constitutionalizing’ the Civil Rights Act.”50
Because the Act had been amended in significant part for the
purpose of clarifying that it would not require integrated schools,
there is strong reason to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment
likewise would have been understood to permit segregation.51
Third, at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, segregated schools were common, either as a matter
Id. at 16.
See id. at 22 (describing John Bingham’s efforts to revise the bill).
48 Id. at 22–23 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1271–72 (1865)).
49 See id. at 29–30, 42–43 (noting that Bingham drafted the privilege or immunities, due
process, and equal protection language that appears in the Fourth Amendment).
50 Id. at 58.
51 See id. (“The obvious conclusion . . . is that section I of the fourteenth amendment, like
section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . . as originally understood, was [not] meant to
apply . . . to . . . segregation.”).
46
47
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of practice or legal requirement, in many Northern and
Midwestern states.52
As Earl Maltz has noted, Republican
proponents of ratification repeatedly assured voters in these
states, particularly the swing states closer to the border of the old
Confederacy, that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have only a minimal impact on their states’ laws.53 (Indeed, this
state of affairs helps to explain why even Republicans favored
eliminating the civil rights provision from the Act of 1866.) It is
difficult to believe that the legislatures in these states would have
ratified the Amendment if it prohibited such a common (and
popular) practice.
As Michael Klarman has explained, the
“political and social context in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted and ratified” makes it “inconceivable that most—
indeed even very many—Americans in 1866–68 would have
endorsed a constitutional amendment to forbid public school
segregation.”54
Finally, most historians to have considered the question have
noted that most Republicans in the 39th Congress—the same
Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment—continued to
support segregated schools in the District of Columbia.55 Before
1862, there was no publicly supported schooling for black children
in the District.56 In that year, Congress enacted laws “initiating a
system of education of colored children,”57 financed by a special tax
on property “owned by persons of color.”58 In 1864, Congress
changed the funding mechanism for the schools for black children

52 See Klarman, supra note 42, at 1885–90 (demonstrating how little support for
desegregation existed in the United States at that time); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991) (noting that “twentyfour of the thirty-seven states then in the union either required or permitted racially
segregated schools”).
53 Maltz, Originalism, supra note 41, at 228–29 (noting that in order to appeal to swing
state voters, Republicans assured voters that Section 1 would only minimally impact
Northern states).
54 Klarman, supra note 42, at 1884.
55 See, e.g., Maltz, Originalism, supra note 41, at 229 (“[C]ontemporaneously with the
Fourteenth Amendment, the same Republicans continued to support the segregated school
system in the District of Columbia.”).
56 McConnell, supra note 43, at 977.
57 Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 77, § 35, 12 Stat. 394, 402.
58 Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, § 1, 12 Stat. 407.
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but apparently kept intact the structure of separate schools.59 In
1866, the same year that Congress approved the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress appropriated money for the two separate
school systems, without questioning whether the system of
segregated schooling was problematic.60 In addition, in 1871 and
1872, Congress debated bills that would have ended the practice of
segregated schools in the District, but they all failed.61 (Anyone
watching the Senate’s deliberation on these bills would have sat,
as Raoul Berger has noted, in a segregated gallery.)62
Of course, because the Fourteenth Amendment directly
constrained only state, and not congressional, power, Congress’s
apparent contemporaneous support for segregated schools in the
District does not dispositively reveal Congress’s understanding of
the “perceived dictates” of the Equal Protection Clause.63 But it
nevertheless is powerful evidence that the same Members of
Congress who passed the Fourteenth Amendment—and used it as
a virtual campaign platform in 186664—did not view integrated
schools as essential to the vision of civil rights that they sought to
instantiate by passage of the Amendment.
As a consequence, the conventional view has long been that
Brown cannot be justified on originalist grounds.65 The Court
itself did not seem to believe that the original understanding of
how the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to the question of
racially segregated schools was, or ought to be, dispositive.66 The
59 See McConnell, supra note 43, at 977–78 (noting that in 1864 Congress abolished the
special tax while assuming that the schools would remain segregated).
60 See Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310, 316 (appropriating funds for various
civil expenses, including schools); Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat. 343 (granting land
for colored schools within the district). Congress did not seriously debate either bill.
61 See McConnell, supra note 43, at 978–80 (discussing the various failed efforts to
desegregate the school systems).
62 See BERGER, supra note 12, at 125.
63 McConnell, supra note 43, at 980.
64 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 58 (1988) (discussing the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment).
65 See McConnell, supra note 43, at 952 (“In the fractured discipline of constitutional law,
there is something very close to a consensus that Brown was inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps at an extremely high and
indeterminate level of abstraction.”).
66 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (“In approaching this problem,
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted . . . .”).
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Court declared that, in approaching the problem, “we cannot turn
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”67 And even
scholars, such as Alexander Bickel, who strongly supported the
outcome in Brown struggled to justify the decision’s rather obvious
departure from the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment.68 Indeed, an entire generation of constitutional law
theorists came of age seeking to justify Brown—and the Court’s
willingness to invalidate the policies at issue in the case—
notwithstanding the fact that the decision could not seek refuge in
the original meaning of the Constitution.69
Raoul Berger, one of the founding fathers of the modern
originalist movement, agreed that the result in Brown was
inconsistent with the original intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and as a consequence he argued that the Court’s
decision—notwithstanding the moral and normative appeal of the
outcome—was incorrect and illegitimate.70 Berger relied on much
of the same evidence described above,71 and he concluded that “the
framers had no intention of striking down segregation.”72 Berger’s
approach was characteristic of the old originalism: it focused on
the subjective intent of the framers (in this case, the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment), and it paid special attention to how the
framers would have expected the text to apply to the particular

67 Id. at 492.
See also McConnell, supra note 43, at 949 (stating that the opinion in
Brown was an “explicit, self-conscious departure from the traditional view that the Court
may override democratic decisions only on the basis of the Constitution’s text, history, and
interpretive tradition—not on considerations of modern social policy”).
68 See Bickel, supra note 42, at 4, 65 (noting the “embarrassment of going counter to . . .
the original understanding”).
69 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1537, 1537 (2004) (“Most law professors agree that any serious normative theory of
constitutional interpretation must be consistent with Brown v. Board of Education and
show why the case was correctly decided.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1959) (describing
the desegregation decisions as posing “the hardest test of my belief in principled
adjudication”). See generally Colby & Smith, supra note 14 (discussing liberals’ attempts to
justify Brown).
70 BERGER, supra note 12, at 117–33, 241–45.
71 Id. at 117–33 (detailing the history of the Civil Rights Act and its connection to the
Equal Protection Clause).
72 Id. at 125.
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question at issue. For Berger, the question was not whether the
result in Brown was desirable; it was, instead, whether the result
was consistent with the original intent.73 Because it was not,
Berger concluded, Brown was wrong.74
But this view, though consistent with the form of original-intent
originalism for which Berger advocated, was a tough sell. By the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the modern originalist
movement was gaining steam, Brown was deeply entrenched in
our legal, political, and cultural norms. Advancing an approach to
constitutional interpretation that maintained that Brown was
wrong was not a particularly effective recipe for attracting new
adherents to the cause. As Michael McConnell observed, “[s]uch is
the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not
produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the
theory is seriously discredited.”75 Indeed, “what once was seen as
a weakness” in the decision—the fact that it cannot be squared
with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment—
had become “a mighty weapon against the proposition that the
Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood by the
people who framed and ratified it.”76
McConnell, who Keith Whittington referred to as “undoubtedly
the most prominent new originalist,”77 thus sought to construct an
originalist argument in favor of Brown.78 He acknowledged there
have been “remarkably few exceptions” to the historical consensus
73 See id. at 133 (noting that whether a law achieves a moral or public good is not the
same as whether the law is constitutional).
74 See id. at 245 (“[Chief Justice Warren] did not merely ‘shape’ the law, he upended
it . . . .”).
75 McConnell, supra note 43, at 952; accord Balkin, supra note 69, at 1537 (“[A]lmost
every serious constitutional theory is already consistent with [Brown].”); J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018 (1998)
(“Our notions of what is canonical tell us that we have to justify Brown . . . .”); Jamal
Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011) (“[A]ll legitimate constitutional
decisions must be consistent with Brown’s rightness, and all credible theories of
constitutional interpretational must accommodate the decision.”); BORK, supra note 12, at
77 (“It is not surprising that academic lawyers were unwilling to give [Brown] up, it had to
be right. Thus, Brown has become the high ground of constitutional theory.”).
76 McConnell, supra note 43, at 952–53.
77 Whittington, supra note 10, at 608.
78 See generally McConnell, supra note 43 (developing an originalist argument in favor of
Brown).
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that Brown was inconsistent with the original meaning.79 But he
attempted to defend Brown on originalist grounds by relying not
on the evidence described above from 1866–1868, but instead on
the views expressed during legislative debates on Senator Charles
Sumner’s proposed Civil Rights Bill in the mid-1870s.80
McConnell put dispositive weight on the fact that during those
debates—which ultimately produced a law that banned racial
discrimination in inns, theaters, common carriers, and other forms
of public accommodation, but not in public schools—between onehalf and two-thirds of both houses of Congress voted, at one point
or another, in favor of school desegregation.81
McConnell acknowledged that evidence from the debates over
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 “might be inferior in principle to
information directly bearing on the opinions and expectations of
the framers and ratifiers during deliberations over the
Amendment itself,” but in his view there was substantially less
evidence “concerning the latter.”82 His interpretive methodology
thus was similar to Berger’s: he sought to ascertain “the original
understanding of the meaning of the [Fourteenth] Amendment as
it bears on the issue of school segregation”83 and “the specific
intentions and understandings of the framing generation
regarding the issue of public school segregation.”84 But in light of
the ultimate failure of the legislative effort in the 1870s to ban
segregation in schools—obviously a problem for the argument that
the debates over the bill establish that the Fourteenth
Amendment was widely understood to prohibit segregated
schools85—McConnell proposed a second “perspective” on the
Id. at 950.
See id. at 984–85.
81 See id. at 953, 985 (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and noting the large number
of votes in which members of Congress voiced opposition to segregated schools).
82 Id. at 984.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1093.
85 McConnell’s argument operated on a more subtle level, as well. He argued that even
though the bills failed, they indicated that many members of Congress understood
themselves to have power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to address these
matters, a power they could enjoy only if Section 1 of the Amendment reached segregation
in public schools. Id. at 990–91. But this argument suffers from at least two problems.
First, it is not clear that the members of the Reconstruction Congress had as narrow a view
79
80
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question of original meaning: an inquiry that considered the
“understanding” of the participants in the debates in the 1870s “of
the relevant constitutional issues—the permissibility of
segregation and the status of education as a civil right.”86
McConnell then adjusted the level of generality at which he
conducted this second inquiry. In a sign of the evolution of
originalist theory, McConnell declared that “[i]t is widely agreed
among originalists that the intentions or understandings of the
framers regarding a specific issue, while informative, are not
ultimately authoritative, for it is their understanding of the
constitutional principles embodied in the constitutional
provision—not their analysis of a particular legal phenomenon—
that is controlling.”87 Accordingly, he also sought to determine the
views of the participants in the congressional debates in the 1870s
on whether “separation by race [is] inconsistent with the
requirement of equality,” and whether “the equality requirement
of the Fourteenth Amendment [applies] to public education.”88
Although “the collective judgment of the Congress in 1875 seemed
to be ‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ to the second,”89 McConnell
suggested that by the mid-twentieth century, education’s status as
a civil right was sufficiently well settled to bring education within
the reach of the principle that the Amendment’s framers had
enacted.90
Even this inquiry was addressed to determining the views of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment on the particular
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
racially segregated schools. Although McConnell concluded that
the result in Brown was consistent with the Amendment’s original
understanding, he was swimming strongly against the historical
of the Section 5 power as modern doctrine suggests. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (rejecting the view that Congress has power under Section 5 to
“enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
Second, the fact that the legislative efforts in the 1870s to prohibit racial segregation in
schools failed undermines the claim that there was a broad consensus in favor of the view
that Section 1 prohibited such segregation.
86 McConnell, supra note 43, at 1093.
87 Id. at 1101.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 1103–04 (explaining that by 1954, public education had become a civil right).
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tide, and in particular the powerful evidence, described above, that
most of the participants in the actual debate over the adoption and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment—and, perhaps more
important, most of the people of the time—appeared to have
understood the Amendment to permit racially segregated
schools.91 Indeed, the weight of opinion about McConnell’s article
is that it was an impressive and sincere effort that nevertheless
fell short of demonstrating that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial segregation in public
schools.92
Justifying Brown on originalist grounds thus would take more
than a careful historical effort to uncover the specific views of the
framers of the Amendment. As McConnell seemed to understand,
to justify Brown we must consider the original meaning at a
higher level of generality. Consider the views of Robert Bork, one
of the founding fathers of the modern originalist movement. Bork
did not ignore the historical evidence described above of views
about segregation’s status under the Fourteenth Amendment; to
the contrary, he acknowledged that “[t]he inescapable fact is that
those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed
segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life.”93 Bork
thus accepted that the framers of the Amendment “assumed that
equality and state-compelled separation of the races were
consistent.”94
But Bork nevertheless contended that the result in Brown was
consistent with the “original understanding of the equal protection
clause.”95 In his view, although “[t]he ratifiers probably assumed
that segregation was consistent with equality,” they “were not
91 See Klarman, supra note 42, at 1891 (explaining that integrated schools were the
exception, not the rule, in the early postbellum period).
92 See, e.g., id. at 1882–83 (praising McConnell’s contributions but critiquing his
orginalist defense of Brown); Maltz, Originalism, supra note 41, at 223 (“[McConnell] adds
greatly to our understanding of the doctrinal arguments that surrounded the desegregation
issue in the 1870s, [but] . . . . fails in his attempt to demonstrate that the decision in Brown
is consistent with the original understanding.”) ; Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does it
Matter What the Court Said in Brown?, 81 TEX. L. REV. 305, 322 (2002) (book review) (“In
the end, McConnell’s opinion is unpersuasive . . . .”).
93 BORK, supra note 12, at 75–76.
94 Id. at 81.
95 Id.
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addressing segregation,” because the “text itself demonstrates that
the equality under law was the primary goal.”96 By 1954, however,
“it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever
produced equality.”97 Bork thus concluded that the result (though
not the reasoning) in Brown was correct as an originalist matter,
because the “purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into
being” was “equality,” and “equality and segregation were
mutually inconsistent,” even “though the ratifiers did not
understand that.”98
In other words, Bork argued that although the Fourteenth
Amendment originally was understood to permit segregated
schools, Brown nevertheless reached the correct result because we
should seek the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment at
a higher level of generality. On this view, the relevant inquiry is
not to determine what the framers or ratifiers of the constitutional
text thought about what it meant or how it would apply, but
instead to seek the objective original meaning of the text by
discerning the broad animating principle behind the text and then
to apply it to concrete (and modern) circumstances.99

Id. at 82.
Id.
98 Id.; accord Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] was intended to enforce a core idea
of black equality against governmental discrimination.”).
99 Steven Calabresi (with Michael Perl) has advanced a more carefully researched version
of this form of originalist argument in defense of Brown. See generally Steven G. Calabresi
& Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education, 3 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429
(2014) (providing originalist defense for Brown); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice For All?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149,
150–51 (2010) [hereinafter Calabresi, Equal Justice] (same). Rather than arguing simply
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires “equality,” as did Bork, Calabresi asserts that the
Fourteenth Amendment “bans all forms of caste-like discrimination,” including the “racial
caste system” that the Court invalidated in Brown. Id. at 149–50; see also John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388–89 (1992)
(“Thus, an amendment that forbade the states from abridging privileges or immunities
would ban caste legislation . . . .”). Because “[a]t the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted, thirty-six of the thirty-seven states required in their state constitutions that public
schools be provided,” Calabresi concludes that the “right to a public school education was,
for all practical purposes, a privilege or immunity of state citizenship.” Calabresi, Equal
Justice, supra, at 150. Segregation in schools, Calabresi argues, impermissibly abridged
that right for African Americans, rendering policies of segregation impermissible forms of
caste-like discrimination. As Bork had argued, Calabresi asserted that “[t]he fact that such
96
97
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I will return shortly to Bork’s approach to Brown, and what it
suggests both about his approach to originalism and the dilemma
of the level of generality more broadly. For now, it is sufficient to
note that, whatever one thinks of Bork’s approach,100 it opened the
floodgates for originalist claims (albeit usually stated conclusorily)
that the result in Brown is defensible on originalist grounds.
Indeed, it is virtually impossible today to find an originalist who
even entertains the possibility that the result in Brown was
inconsistent with the original meaning.101
III. BEYOND BROWN
Consider two immediate implications of Bork’s approach to
Brown. First, it helps to immunize originalism from claims that it
segregation had been practiced in 1868 and had been around for a very long time did not
change the fact that it was and always had been unconstitutional.” Id. at 151.
100 For critiques of Bork’s position, see Brest, supra note 35, at 1091–92 (“The fact is that
all adjudication requires making choices among the levels of generality . . . and all such
choices are inherently non-neutral. No form of constitutional decision-making can be
salvaged if its legitimacy depends on satisfying Bork’s requirements that principles be
neutrally derived, defined, and applied.” (internal quotations omitted)); Richard A. Posner,
Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1375–76 (1990) (calling Bork’s position
unconvincing and inconsistent); Raoul Berger, Robert Bork’s Contribution To Original
Intention, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1176–83 (1990) (book review) (criticizing Bork’s view of
Brown); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373,
1379–82 (1990) (book review) (asserting that Bork’s originalist defense of Brown is
ineffective).
101 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 773-780 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]y view was the rallying cry for the
lawyers who litigated Brown.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 88 (2012) (asserting that the text of the Equal Protection
Clause “can reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert the separateness
and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to treat the races equally”);
Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 151 (“The fact that such segregation had been
practiced in 1868 and had been around for a very long time did not change the fact that it
was and always had been unconstitutional. For this reason, the Supreme Court was on
solid originalist ground when it struck down segregation in public schools.”); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J.
1693, 1763 (2010) (“We believe that Brown’s holding extending the equality guarantee
beyond private contract to public schooling can be defended on originalist grounds. . . .”);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require
Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165,
1194 (2008) (“Brown is a marvelous decision, a wonderful restoration of a lost original
understanding of the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and a repudiation
of a socially invented limitation on that meaning by the Jim Crow era.”).
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cannot account for some of the most widely accepted, and
normatively desirable, judicially created doctrines of constitutional
law from the twentieth century: the Court’s invalidation of bans on
interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia102 and the Court’s
application of heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the
basis of sex.103 Failure to accommodate these decisions, like a
failure to justify Brown, would be not only a significant
embarrassment for originalism, but also likely fatal for the claim
that originalism is the only legitimate means of assigning
constitutional meaning. Second, it creates the possibility of an
originalist justification for constitutional prohibitions on
previously unrecognized bases for discrimination—such as sexual
orientation—and constitutional protection for rights that have
conventionally been thought to be untethered to the original
meaning of the Constitution.
A. EQUAL PROTECTION

Consider how Bork’s approach would apply to prohibitions on
interracial marriage. In Loving, the Court invalidated Virginia’s
ban on most interracial marriages.104
As with Brown, the
conventional view is that Loving cannot be reconciled with the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.105
Indeed,
Virginia’s brief in the Supreme Court relied heavily on the original
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.”).
104 388 U.S. at 11–12.
105 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 228 (2011) (“If we follow . . . originalmeaning originalism. . . . Loving v. Virginia is wrong . . . .”); RANDALL KENNEDY,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 252 (2003) (“The
historical record strongly indicates that the politicians who framed the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend for it to render illegal statutes prohibiting interracial
marriage.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 247 (1995) (arguing that Loving cannot
be justified on originalist grounds); Cass Sunstein, Debate on Radicals in Robes, in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 293 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007)
(contending that an originalist view of the Constitution cannot justify the invalidation of
bans on interracial marriage); Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 996 (1998) (criticizing John Harrison’s originalist defense of
Loving); Klarman, Response, supra note 42, at 1919–20 (noting that even if one accepts
McConnell’s originalist defense of Brown, it would not justify the result in Loving).
102
103
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understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.106 Although the
Court in Loving reiterated its claim from Brown that evidence of
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with
respect to the question of interracial marriage bans was “at
best . . . inconclusive,”107 the evidence is in fact quite strong that
the framers did not understand the Amendment to prohibit bans
on interracial marriage. Laws banning interracial marriage were
commonplace at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition, when opponents of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the civil rights bills in
the 1870s regularly (and perhaps demagogically) opposed those
provisions in part on the ground that they would invalidate state
bans on interracial marriage, Republican supporters repeatedly
stressed that they would not disturb those bans.108 Presumably for
this reason, the Supreme Court itself has suggested that the
decision in Loving was not rooted in the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.109
Accordingly, early accounts of Loving concluded that it was
indefensible on originalist grounds. The year before the Court
decided Loving, Alfred Avins contended, after a survey of the
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and related legislation,
106 See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee, in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 794, 798 (Philip B. Kurland &
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
107 388 U.S. at 9 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)).
108 See Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1253 (1966) (“No Republican member of Congress
advocated miscegenation, [yet] . . . . [t]he Democrats injected the cry of amalgamation into
every conceivable debate, no matter how irrelevant it actually was.”).
109 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (stating that “neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack” (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992) (resisting the
“tempting” view that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted consistent with its
original understanding, because “[m]arriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and
interracial marriage was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no
doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause”). David Upham has contested the
view that interracial marriage was, in practice, illegal in most states after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that bans often were not enforced. See David R.
Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 259–80 (2015).
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that no one in the Congress that drafted and adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment “seriously thought” that state laws
banning interracial marriage “were within the pale of the
amendment’s prohibitions.”110
Similarly, Raoul Berger, after
reviewing the congressional debates over the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, asserted that “[f]ew of the most ardent
abolitionists would have dared argue for intermarriage at this
time, because it would have wrecked their hope of securing the
indispensable ‘fundamental rights’ to blacks.”111 He acknowledged
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the Fourteenth
Amendment effectively constitutionalized, protected the right of
African Americans to make and enforce contracts; but in light of
the statements by the framers about interracial marriage, “[t]o
attribute to the framers an intention by the word ‘contract’ to
authorize intermarriage runs counter to all intendments.”112
Accordingly, he concluded that the framers “did not mean to
prevent exclusion from . . . miscegenation laws.”113 Unlike the case
of segregated schools, moreover, there is no evidence, even in the
decade that followed the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that a majority (let alone a super-majority) of members of
Congress believed that the Amendment prohibited state laws
banning interracial marriage.114
110 Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws, supra note 108, at 1253. Avins’s account was selfconsciously originalist in nature, even if that term had not yet been coined to describe his
approach. See id. at 1225 (“I believe that once the original understanding and intent of the
framers is ascertained, the inquiry should be at an end.”).
111 BERGER, supra note 12, at 161.
112 Id. at 161–62.
113 Id. at 241.
114 Presumably for this reason, Michael McConnell, in the course of endeavoring to
demonstrate that the result in Brown was consistent with the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, did not offer a similarly robust defense of Loving. To be sure,
McConnell asserted that “it is striking that not a single supporter of the 1875 Act attempted
to deny that under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional.”
McConnell, Desegregation Decisions, supra note 43, at 1018. But he also concluded that the
“effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to alter the boundary between civil and social
rights, but to make race an unreasonable basis for discrimination within the civil sphere.”
Id. at 1022–23.
As Michael Klarman has noted, because “McConnell accepts the
conventional view that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment distinguished civil from
political and social rights, and barred racial discrimination only with regard to the former,”
and because “interracial marriage” was plainly a “social” right, McConnell’s approach
cannot justify Loving. Klarman, supra note 42, at 1919–20. But see Upham, supra note
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But what if we seek the Amendment’s original meaning at a
higher level of generality? According to Steven Calabresi and
Andrea Matthews, when one asks the correct question, it becomes
“very easy” to see why Loving is correct as an originalist matter.115
Calabresi and Matthews do not dispute the traditional view that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand the
Amendment to invalidate bans on interracial marriage.116 But
they contend that the original-intent originalism exemplified by
Raoul Berger’s work was “wrong,” and that the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment trumps the framers’
subjective understandings and expectations about how it would
apply.117 On their account, which they support principally by
citing to a series of nineteenth century dictionaries, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected “positive law entitlements” in state common, statutory,
and constitutional law “conferring civil rights on state citizens”;
the rights that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected, including
the right “to make and enforce contracts”; and other “fundamental
rights.”118 They then reason that in 1868, the right to marry—
which, at bottom, is just a contractual relationship—clearly was
both a privilege and immunity of state citizenship, a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship, and a fundamental right.119
Accordingly, they argue, laws banning racial intermarriage
“obviously” “abridge or shorten or lessen the literal right of African
Americans and white Americans ‘to make and enforce
contracts.’ ”120 They assert, in an echo of Bork’s argument about
109, at 259–80 (arguing that after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Republican
judges and officials routinely declined to enforce bans on interracial marriage, based upon a
belief that such bans violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
115 Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1393, 1398.
116 See id. (describing as a “fact” the assertion that “the Reconstruction Framers expected
their laws to be consistent with . . . bans on racial intermarriage”).
117 Id. at 1475.
118 Id. at 1413–20.
119 See id. at 1419–20 (describing the right to marry as both a privilege or immunity of
state citizenship and a fundamental right).
120 Id. at 1422 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra
note 99, at 151 (arguing that Loving was correctly decided “because the Fourteenth
Amendment had constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which said that African
Americans had the ‘same’ right to make contracts as was enjoyed by a while citizen”);
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Brown, that after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
state “clearly” could not constitutionally restrict the right to marry
with racially discriminatory laws, “even though almost no-one
realized it at the time.”121
To be sure, there is nothing particularly novel—even in
originalist circles these days—about Calabresi and Matthews’s
suggestion that we should ignore the framers’ original intent,
subjective understandings, or expectations about how the
constitutional text would apply. For years now, most originalists
have moved, at least as a formal matter, towards the conclusion
that the appropriate object in constitutional interpretation is the
original objective meaning of the text, not the framers’ subjective
intent, understanding, or expectations.122 Their approach to the
question of interracial marriage—like Bork’s approach to the
validity of racial segregation under the Equal Protection Clause—
is simply a move in that direction.
But this approach, in conjunction with an inquiry that seeks the
original meaning at a higher level of generality, can unsettle
conventional understandings of the Constitution’s original
meaning in other contexts, as well. Consider the question of the
constitutional status of official discrimination on the basis of sex.
At the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
states routinely excluded women from the benefits of equal
citizenship. The text of the Amendment itself, in Section 2,123 by
Harrison, supra note 99, at 1459–60 (stating that both the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited bans on interracial marriage).
121 Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 115, at 1419–20; see also id. at 1421 (“Obviously,
many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that the government had a
compelling interest in preventing interracial marriage, but it is just as obvious that it was a
ban on racial intermarriage which lay at the bottom of the very racial caste system that the
Fourteenth Amendment was written to extirpate.”); Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99,
at 151–52 (“[T]he fact the Framers of the Amendment did not understand [that the
Fourteenth Amendment gave African Americans the right to marry white citizens] means
nothing. Members of Congress rarely read much less understand the laws they make, but
that does not make those laws any less binding on all of us.”).
122 See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 250–55 (describing the shift from original intent
to original objective meaning); Colby, supra note 18, at 720–30 (discussing how new
originalists reject a search for subjective intent and instead seek objective meaning).
123 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of [a] State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
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implication tolerates the denial to women of the right to vote.124
Indeed, during the debate over the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and
other women’s rights advocates publicly campaigned to remove
gender as a measure of suffrage.125 They also petitioned Congress
for a constitutional amendment to “prohibit the several States
from disfranchising any of their citizens on the ground of sex.”126
Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced the petition into the
Congressional Record, and two years later other Senators proposed
language that would have incorporated a universal suffrage
provision into the Fifteenth Amendment, but the efforts failed.127
Women’s rights advocates then began a campaign to convince
the courts that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in
particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause, protected women
against discrimination in the grant of the franchise and in the
exercise of other rights.128 Just a few years after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Court made clear its
view that the exclusion of women from the practice of law did not
offend the Amendment.129 Several years later, in the course of
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the exclusion
of African Americans from service on juries, the Court reasoned
that the state “may confine the selection to males,” because it did
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age
in such State.”).
124 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 13 (2010) (“Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . actually enshrines sex discrimination, by assuming that the
electorate will consist only of men.”); Michael C. Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 923,
933 (2012) (“At the very least, the inclusion of the word ‘male’ in Section 2 tells us that the
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend or expect it to extend the
franchise to women.”).
125 See Ellen Carol Dubois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman
Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820–1878, 74 J. AM. HIS. 836, 847 (1987).
126 Petition for Universal Suffrage, THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & SUSAN B. ANTHONY
PAPERS PROJECT, http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/rutuniv.html (last updated Aug. 2010).
127 See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 969–70 & n.59 (2002) (describing
proposals by Senators Pomeroy and Fowler).
128 Id. at 972.
129 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“[T]he civil
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman.”).
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“not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to
prohibit [that].”130
Indeed, women did not gain the right to vote until the adoption
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1919,131 and the Court did not
conclude that discrimination by the government on the basis of sex
triggered meaningful concerns under the Equal Protection Clause
until the early 1970s, when the drive to adopt the Equal Rights
Amendment—to correct the Constitution’s failure to protect
women against discrimination—was in full steam.132 When the
Court finally concluded, in 1976, that classifications on the basis of
gender triggered heightened scrutiny, it did not even purport to
suggest that this approach was required by the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating instead (rather dubiously)
only that “previous cases” established the proper test.133
As a consequence, at least until recently, the widely accepted
view has been that the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not prohibit the states from classifying on the
basis of sex. For example, shortly after the Supreme Court held
that official sex discrimination triggers heightened scrutiny, future
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that “[b]oldly dynamic
interpretation,
departing
radically
from
the
original
understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth amendment’s
equal protection clause a command that government treat men
and women as individuals equal in rights, responsibilities, and
opportunities.”134
This view was not confined to those who are skeptical of
originalism as a means for ascertaining constitutional meaning.
Lino Graglia, who was a prominent academic defender of
originalism in the 1980s and 1990s, summarized the conventional
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”).
132 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“To give a mandatory preference to members
of either sex over members of the other . . . is to make the very kind of arbitrary, legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ”);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that
classifications based on sex are “inherently suspect”).
133 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
134 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161.
130
131
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view about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
when he declared that
there is no real doubt that the purpose of the equal
protection
clause
was
to
prohibit
certain
discriminations by states on the basis of race. This
provision, given our history, is an important
protection, but one that has absolutely nothing to do
with the power of the states to make distinctions on
many other grounds, such as on the basis of sex . . . .135
As a consequence, Graglia argued, “Supreme Court decisions
denying popularly elected state representatives the authority to
make such distinctions are not legitimate constitutional
decisions.”136 Similarly, Robert Bork, who proposed reading the
Equal Protection Clause at a high level of generality to justify the
Court’s decision in Brown, criticized the Court’s cases applying
heightened scrutiny to laws classifying on the basis of sex,
principally on the ground that the “ratifiers of the fourteenth
amendment did not intend to treat women as a special class
deserving protection as they did intend with respect to blacks.”137
He concluded that “the equal protection clause should be restricted
to race and ethnicity because to go further would plunge the courts
into making law without guidance from anything the ratifiers
understood themselves to be doing.”138
This view, moreover, is not confined to old originalists writing
in the 1970s and 1980s. In 2011, Calvin Massey interviewed
Justice Scalia for a magazine article. Massey noted that “[i]n
135 Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme
Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 795 (1987).
136 Id.; see also Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an
Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 776 (1998) (“In short, all talk of the Supreme
Court ‘interpreting’ the Constitution in reaching its controversial rulings of
unconstitutionality is purely conventional and entirely misleading.”).
137 BORK, supra note 12, at 326. Bork also reasoned that, because “our society feels very
strongly that relevant differences exist [between men and women] and should be respected
by government,” a “court that applies the fourteenth amendment to women as a special
group, rather than as part of the human race, must make cultural and political choices that
it need not make when applying the amendment to racial groups.” Id. at 329.
138 Id. at 330.
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1868, when the 39th Congress was debating and ultimately
proposing the [Fourteenth] Amendment, I don’t think anybody
would have thought that equal protection applied to sex
discrimination.” He then asked Justice Scalia whether the Court
had “gone off in error by applying the [Fourteenth] Amendment” to
it.139 Justice Scalia responded:
Certainly the Constitution does not require
discrimination on the basis of sex. The only issue is
whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever
thought that that’s what it meant. Nobody ever voted
for that. If the current society wants to outlaw
discrimination by sex, hey we have things called
legislatures, and they enact things called laws. You
don’t need a constitution to keep things up-to-date. All
you need is a legislature and a ballot box.140
It appears, moreover, that reformulating the question as
McConnell did for the question of segregated schools would not
change this result. Ward Farnsworth examined not only the
debates from 1866 to 1868 on the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Congress, but also “congressional debates between
1871 and 1875 over bills to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,”
to determine “what the Reconstruction Congresses understood
themselves to have accomplished.”141 He acknowledged that much
of the congressional debate about the effect of the Amendment on

139 The Originalist: Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia, CAL. LAWYER (Jan. 2011),
http:// www.calllawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=Nan&eid=913358&evid=1.
140 Id.; see also Legally Speaking: Antonin Scalia, UCTV (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.uctv.
tv/search-details.aspx?showID=20773 (recording of University of California Television
broadcast). Justice Scalia also declared, in an interview at Hastings Law School, that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not ban sex discrimination because “[n]obody thought it was
directed against sex discrimination.” Adam Cohen, Justice Scalia Mouths Off on Sex
Discrimination, TIME (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,202
0667,00.html; cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that courts should apply rational-basis review to sex-based classifications
because “[i]t is hard to consider women a ‘discrete and insular minorit[y]’ ” (alteration in
original)).
141 Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2000).
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women was “indirect,” in that it took place in the course of more
heated debates about the Amendment’s effect on matters of race.142
But in so doing, the “congressmen frequently appear to [have
drawn] on widely shared beliefs about women and the regime of
laws affecting them,” often “appeal[ing] to settled understandings
about the legal position of women to challenge their adversaries in
arguments about other issues, usually involving race, that [were]
more controversial.”143
Even as they disagreed over the
Amendment’s application to matters of race, therefore, there was
“evidence of much common ground among them regarding the
Amendment’s implications for women.”144 In light of this evidence,
Farnsworth concluded that “[t]he Amendment was understood not
to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very
substantial legal disabilities on women, particularly married
women.”145 Accordingly, the “type of originalism that Professor
McConnell uses to show that Brown was correctly
decided . . . leads to the conclusion that nineteenth-century laws
imposing
serious
legal
disabilities
on
women
were
constitutional.”146
To reach the conclusion that the original meaning of the
Constitution
presumptively
prohibits
the
states
from
discriminating on the basis of sex, in other words, requires a
significantly more creative approach, and at a minimum one that
does not rely simply on the subjective intentions and expectations
of the framers of the constitutional text.147 Such an approach is
also crucial for the viability of originalism, as it has become
untenable to maintain that the Constitution tolerates official
discrimination on the basis of sex, just as no respectable theory of
constitutional interpretation today can lead to the conclusion that
Brown was wrong.148
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1233.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1230.
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 124, at 934 (contending that if the expectations of the
framers control, modern sex discrimination jurisprudence is indefensible).
148 See id. at 935 (“[I]t would simply be unthinkable that in 2012 the Equal Protection
Clause could be interpreted to permit most forms of official sex discrimination.”).
142
143
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And, in fact, Steven Calabresi has recently contended that
originalism requires the conclusion that the Constitution forbids
discrimination on the basis of gender.149 The argument requires
us both to consider the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment at a higher level of generality than is used in the
conventional account, described above, and to understand the
Amendment through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment,
which was adopted a half-century later.150
First, Calabresi
reasoned that the broad principle animating the Fourteenth
Amendment is a ban on “all forms of caste-like discrimination.”151
Second, he noted that “the Constitution explicitly addresses the
subject of sex discrimination in the Nineteenth Amendment,”
which “gave women the right to vote.”152 That right, in turn, “is a
political right, unlike the civil rights addressed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”153 Third, Calabresi observed that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment “distinguished between civil rights, which
were possessed by all citizens, including women and children, and
political rights, which were exercised only by the male subset of

149 See Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 152 (arguing that the Nineteenth
Amendment requires the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment bans sex
discrimination with respect to civil rights).
150 Reva Siegel has similarly argued that we should understand the Constitution’s
treatment of sex discrimination in light of the interaction between the Fourteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments. See Siegel, supra note 127, at 1039–44 (advocating for an
interpretation of sex discrimination doctrine grounded in a reading of the Fourteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments as well as the history of the Women’s Suffrage Movement). Her
approach, however, consciously eschewed the form of originalism on which Calabresi relies.
See id. at 1032 (“[T]he actions of past generations of Americans who made or lived under
the Constitution do not bind us in any simple sense.”). Siegel argued the Nineteenth
Amendment, which was the “product of a wide-ranging, multigenerational debate over the
terms of women’s citizenship in a democratic constitutional order,” is effectively “part of the
post-ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id. at 1034, and that “an additional
foundation for sex discrimination doctrine” can emerge from “a synthetic reading of the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments that is grounded in the history of the woman
suffrage campaign,” id. at 949.
151 Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 149; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T.
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011) (“Section
One . . . enact[ed] a rule against class legislation and systems of caste.”); Harrison, supra
note 99, at 1413 (noting that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away
with “caste” legislation).
152 Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 152.
153 Id.
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the population.”154
Fifth, he reasoned that, “[o]nce the
Constitution had been amended to bar sex discrimination as to
political rights it became utterly implausible that the no-caste
command of the Fourteenth Amendment did not also ban most, if
not all, sex discrimination as to civil rights” because “[p]olitical
rights are rarer and more jealously guarded then civil rights.”155
To reach these conclusions, Calabresi had to make a move
similar to the one that Bork had made years earlier about
Brown.156 In an article developing the argument in greater detail,
Calabresi and Julia Rickert conceded that the “Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment” did not “understand sex
discrimination to be a form of caste or of special-interest class
legislation,” but argued that “the Framers’ original expected
applications of the constitutional text . . . are not the last word on
the Fourteenth Amendment’s reach.”157
The framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, they explained, were “mistaken in their
belief that laws discriminating on the basis of sex are not
relevantly similar to laws that discriminate on the basis of race.”158
Those framers “conceded that if women had been fitted by nature
for the privileges and responsibilities afforded to men, then the
fears of some and the hopes of others that the Fourteenth
Amendment would threaten the sexual social order would be well
founded.”159 But “[w]e now know more about women’s capabilities
than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers knew.”160
And
because, “as Robert Bork has explained, we are governed by the
constitutional law that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
wrote and not by the unenacted opinions that its members held,” it
“follows that we also are not bound by their unenacted factual
beliefs about the capabilities of women.”161 Moreover, they argue,
unlike the evolving understandings about the harms of

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 151, at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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segregation, the “change in our understanding of women’s abilities
has been constitutionalized” by a subsequent amendment.162
On Calabresi’s and Rickert’s account, the “definition of caste”—
a term that does not appear in the Fourteenth Amendment—“had
not changed; rather, the capabilities of women and the truth of
their status in society had come to be better understood and that
new understanding was memorialized in the text of the
Constitution.”163 Accordingly, even though the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment “inject[ed] their assumptions about
women’s competence and proper sphere into the text of [Section 2
of] the Fourteenth Amendment,” making it “very difficult to read
the original 1868 version of the Fourteenth Amendment as a bar to
sex discrimination,” the Nineteenth Amendment nevertheless
made it “implausible to read the no-caste rule of the Fourteenth
Amendment as allowing discrimination on the basis of sex with
respect to civil rights.”164 Applying an approach similar to the one
that Bork advocated for in Brown, in other words, creates the
possibility of an originalist justification for the Court’s cases
subjecting gender discrimination to heightened scrutiny.
If we are willing to follow this approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment, then there is no obvious reason why we would have
to stop with discrimination on the basis of race and gender.
Applying Bork’s approach to Brown also creates the possibility of
an originalist justification for constitutional condemnation of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and constitutional
protection for rights—including the fundamental right of gay
people to marry the same-sex partners of their choice—that, when
viewed at a high level of specificity, do not find clear support in our
historical traditions.
The question whether the Fourteenth Amendment, as an
original matter, presumptively prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation does not seem very difficult to most
people.
Given the relatively recent vintage of societal
condemnation of discrimination against gays and lesbians—and
the continuing debate over whether it even ought to be
162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 66–67.
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prohibited—there is little doubt that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not believe that the Amendment would prohibit
such discrimination in the same way that it prohibits (at least
some forms of) official discrimination on the basis of race. To
decide that the Amendment nevertheless presumptively prohibits
discrimination on this basis, therefore, requires one to conclude
that the meaning of the Amendment has changed, a conclusion
generally inconsistent with originalist interpretation.165 This, at
least, was the thrust of Justice Scalia’s questions at oral
arguments in Hollingsworth v. Perry,166 which involved a challenge
(based at least in part on the Equal Protection Clause) to
California’s ban on same-sex marriage. He stated, “We don’t
prescribe law for the future. [We] decide what the law is. I’m
curious, when [did] it become unconstitutional to exclude
homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted?”167 When Ted Olson, the
counsel for the respondents, responded that it became
unconstitutional when “we . . . as a culture determined that sexual
orientation is a characteristic of individuals that they cannot
control,” Justice Scalia pressed him to provide the date when the
Constitution “change[d].”168
Seeking the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by asking
how the framers of the Amendment expected it to apply, in other
words, cannot plausibly yield the conclusion that official
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
unconstitutional. And even if one is willing to depart from the
specific expectations of the framers, one cannot rely, as did
Calabresi and Matthews in addressing official discrimination on
the basis of gender, on the adoption of a subsequent constitutional
amendment—in that case, the Nineteenth Amendment—that
touches on the question. For this reason, Calabresi declared in
2010 that the Fourteenth Amendment, properly understood as an
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). The Court in Hollingsworth did not resolve the question,
concluding instead that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the district court’s
decision. See id. at 2656.
167 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (no.
12-144)
168 Id. at 39–40.
165
166
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originalist matter, does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.169
Yet Calabresi and Matthews’s argument about gender
discrimination did not rely exclusively on the Nineteenth
Amendment. Their argument followed from their premise that we
should seek the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment at
a high level of generality, reading it to prohibit caste-based
discrimination rather than to prohibit only the certain limited
forms of discrimination on the basis of race to which most of its
framers would have understood it to apply.170 That argument—on
which Calabresi relied in defending Brown and Loving on
originalist grounds, as well—is simply a variation of the argument
that Bork advanced in defense of Brown.171 And if we follow that
approach, then the originalist case for prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation becomes more plausible.
For simplicity’s sake, consider how Bork’s approach to Brown
applies to the case of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Recall that Bork argued that Brown was correct as an
original matter because the “purpose that brought the fourteenth
amendment into being” was “equality,” and “equality and
segregation were mutually inconsistent,” even “though the
ratifiers did not understand that.”172 It does not take very much
creative lawyering to argue, in the case of same-sex marriage, that
even though “the ratifiers probably assumed that” bans on samesex marriage were “consistent with equality,” they “were not
addressing” that practice, because the “text itself demonstrates

169 See Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 153 (concluding that “the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ban on castes” does not “bar all forms of sexual-orientation discrimination,”
because “[n]o constitutional amendment like the Nineteenth Amendment has been adopted
that recognizes sexual orientation as being a suspect classification,” and thus “[n]o Article V
consensus . . . has been demonstrated”).
170 See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 115, at 1412 n.65 (“[The Fourteenth
Amendment] protects against laws that discriminate on the basis of class or caste . . . .”).
171 See BORK, supra note 12, at 82 (“The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment
into being was equality before the law . . . .”); Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at
151–52 (discussing Brown and Loving).
172 BORK, supra note 12, at 82; accord Bork, supra note 98, at 14–15 (“The Court
must . . . choose a general principle of equality that applies to all cases.”).
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that the equality under the law was the primary goal.”173 To be
sure, once one is willing to extend the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause beyond the practices that prompted its adoption,
one must resolve the thorny question of “how far the protection of
the clause may be extended . . . .”174
But having already
apparently accepted that the Clause can apply to forms of
discrimination that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
believed would be permissible, the choice to extend its reach to
other bases for discrimination is simply an interpretive move of
degree, not of kind.
And, in fact, some prominent originalists have begun
tentatively to suggest that there is an originalist justification for
the view that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
violates the equality norms in the Fourteenth Amendment. In
2013, Michael Ramsey suggested that there is a “plausible,” even if
not “conclusive,” originalist case “against sexual orientation
discrimination.”175 He reasoned that the original public meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause prohibited “discrimination on the
basis of characteristics such as race,” and that although “people at
the time the clause was adopted didn’t think” that sexual
orientation was a characteristic like race, the “facts underlying
sexual orientation might . . . affect sexual orientation’s status
under the fixed meaning of ‘equal.’ ”176
Because “[o]ur
understanding of sexual orientation today” is “factually very
different from the nineteenth century understanding,” we “might
conclude that sexual orientation discrimination violates ‘equal’
treatment in the sense that ‘equal’ was understood by the drafters
and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”177

173 BORK, supra note 12, at 82; see id. at 81 (arguing that “those who ratified” the
Fourteenth Amendment “intended black equality, which they demonstrated by adopting the
equal protection clause”).
174 Id. at 330.
175 Michael Ramsey, Is There an Originalist Case for Same-Sex Marriage?, THE
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 25, 2013), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/
2013/03/is-there-an-originalist-case-for-same-sex-marriagemichael-ramsey.html.
176 Id.
177 Id.; see also Grant Darwin, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 16 U. PA. J. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 237, 278–80 (2013) (arguing that a decision invalidating bans on same-sex
marriage can be justified with an originalist approach).
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More recently, Ilya Somin argued that bans on same-sex
marriage are a form of impermissible discrimination on the basis
of sex,178 presumably because “[s]ame sex marriage laws allow a
man to marry a woman but not another man.”179 Although “most
informed observers” in the nineteenth century “believed that all or
nearly all sex-discriminatory laws of that era were constitutional,”
that “conclusion was premised on factual understandings about
women’s capabilities that have been superseded by later evidence.
Similarly, nineteenth century (and later) support for laws
restricting marriage on the basis of gender [was] also premised on
factual assumptions that later evidence proves largely false.”180
Somin asserts that these arguments are “distinctively originalist”
because they “provide evidence that the ‘broad principle’ ”—
forbidding caste-like discrimination—“was understood to be
included in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of
enactment.”181 Steven Calabresi, who had asserted just a few
years earlier that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or bans on samesex marriage, now apparently agrees with this view.182 If we seek
the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause at a high level
of generality and embrace a willingness to depart from the specific
understanding and expectations of the framers, in other words,
then the Clause in practice can have far-reaching application.

178 See Ilya Somin, William Eskridge on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir
acy/wp/2015/01/23/william-eskridge-on-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage/
(“[L]aws
forbidding same sex marriage . . . amount to unconstitutional sex discrimination.”).
179 Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah Besley, Gay Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment,
at 24 (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 14-51, October 13, 2014), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2509443.
180 Somin, supra note 178.
181 Ilya Somin, Originalism is Broad Enough to Include Arguments for a Constitutional
Right to Same-Sex Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/originalism-is-broad-enough-toinclude-arguments-for-a-constitutional-right-to-same-sex-marriage/.
182 See Calabresi & Besley, supra note 179, at 1 (providing an originalist argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex marriage).
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B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The same-sex marriage cases involved not only a claim under
the Equal Protection Clause, but also a claim that the state bans
impermissibly interfered with the fundamental right to marry—a
right that, as a matter of doctrine, is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.183 Originalists traditionally
have been quite skeptical of constitutional protection for
unenumerated rights.184 That skepticism has been based both on
the normative claim that it is anti-democratic and inconsistent
with the judicial role to invalidate popular legislation without a
clear textual and historical warrant,185 and the interpretive claim
that fidelity to the Constitution forecloses the possibility of judicial
protection for rights that are not specifically mentioned in the
constitutional text or clearly within the contemplation of the
framers.186
Consider Robert Bork’s approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection for unenumerated rights. In Bork’s view,
Griswold v. Connecticut187 and Roe v. Wade188—to take two
prominent examples—were indefensible on originalist grounds
because contraception is not “covered specifically or by obvious
implication by any provision of the Constitution,” and “the right to
abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be found in the
Constitution.”189
Bork, in other words, sought the original
meaning at a very low level of generality when the question was

183 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (“The Court now holds that
same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”).
184 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 98, at 9 (“When the Constitution has not spoken, the Court
will be able to find no scale, other than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the
respective claims . . . .”).
185 See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1987)
(“[J]udicial review is legitimate only when courts adhere strictly to the text of the
Constitution.”); Bork, supra note 98, at 10 (“Where the Constitution does not embody the
moral or ethical choice, the judge has basis other than his own values upon which to set
aside the community judgment embodied in the statute. That, by definition, is an
inadequate basis for judicial supremacy.”).
186 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 117–19, 125, 133; BORK, supra note 12, at 185.
187 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
188 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
189 BORK, supra note 12, at 112, 258; see also id. at 113–14.
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whether the Constitution protected unenumerated rights.190 For
Bork, the case was even clearer because the Court’s decisions in
Griswold and Roe, like the incorporation cases that preceded them,
anchored the rights in question in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Bork argued that the “transformation of
the due process clause from a procedural to a substantive
requirement was an obvious sham.”191 He noted, as had John Hart
Ely, that “‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in
terms. . . .”192
Bork’s view about substantive due process was long the
conventional view among originalists. Raoul Berger asserted that
the concept of due process plainly “did not comprehend judicial
power to override legislation on substantive or policy grounds.”193
He called the doctrine of substantive due process (in what he
obviously did not intend as a compliment) “largely a product of the
post-1937 era,” at least to the extent that its application was
“libertarian” in nature, and thus unmoored from the historical
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.194 Justice Scalia
similarly has repeatedly “reject[ed] the proposition that the Due
Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather
than merely guarantees certain procedures as a prerequisite to
deprivation of liberty.”195 On this view, judicial protection for
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause is self-evidently
incorrect, and thus must be incorrect as an original matter,
because the very concept of “substantive due process” is
“oxymoronic.”196

190 See Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 586 (“Bork argued that judges should decline to
find any specific rights in [the Privilege or Immunity Clause]’s capacious language.”).
191 BORK, supra note 12, at 31.
192 Id. at 32.
193 BERGER, supra note 12, at 194.
194 Id. at 140; see also id. at 249–50 (criticizing substantive due process).
195 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); accord McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting his “misgivings”
about substantive due process). Justice Scalia has declared that he was willing to make an
exception in the case of incorporation of substantive rights specifically mentioned in the Bill
of Rights, but only because the Court’s practice of doing so “is both long established and
narrowly limited.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 275.
196 Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide
the Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77 (2011).
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At the core of the traditional originalist objection to judicial
protection for unenumerated rights, however, is the concern that,
without specific guidance from the constitutional text, judges
would simply impose their own policy preferences under the guise
of interpretation, a practice that most originalists find both
lawless and anti-democratic.197 This concern helps to explain why
Bork and other originalists have maintained this view even in the
face of substantial historical evidence that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment understood the Privileges or Immunities
Clause (even if not the Due Process Clause) to protect
unenumerated fundamental rights. The historical record is far too
rich for anything other than a cursory treatment here, but for
present purposes it suffices to note that the framers of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly
declared that those enactments would protect “[s]uch fundamental
rights as belong to every free person.”198 As Senator Jacob
Howard, the principal sponsor of the Amendment in the Senate,
explained, the Amendment would protect not only “the personal
rights guarant[e]ed and secured by the first eight amendments,”
but also the “privileges and immunities spoken of in” Article IV, a
category that was understood to refer to natural rights and thus
that “cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise
nature.”199 The debates are filled with uncontradicted assertions
that the Amendment would “give to a citizen of the United States
the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship.”200
Notwithstanding this evidence, Bork categorically rejected the
position that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
unenumerated rights, arguing instead that judges should decline
to find any specific rights in that clause’s seemingly capacious
197 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 4–5 (discussing the importance of
strict adherence to the text of the Constitution).
198 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
199 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
200 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Woodbridge). See
BARNETT, supra note 31, at 60–68 (discussing members of the 39th Congress’s view on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 28 (1980)
(noting that Senator Howard’s speech provides support for a broad interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause). See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE (1986) (discussing incorporation); cf. BARNETT, supra note 31, at 54–60 (addressing
historical understandings of the Ninth Amendment); ELY, supra, at 34–41 (same).
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language.201 The clause is phrased so broadly, he argued, as to
make its meaning a complete “mystery.”202 And a “provision whose
meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision that is
written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering by an ink
blot. No judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the ground
that there must be something under it.”203 Bork’s approach was
based both on the assumption that the framers could not possibly
have intended to vest unelected judges with the power to
determine and enforce unenumerated rights204 and the concern
that judicial reliance on vague constitutional language to produce
specific results inevitably would be simply a guise for judicial
willfulness,205 the precise practice that gave rise to the need for
originalism in the first place.206
Justice Scalia’s approach to unenumerated rights was similar,
though he had very little to say about the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and its original meaning.
He has serious
“misgivings . . . as an original matter” about judicial protection for
unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,207 but
(presumably as a matter of stare decisis) he has not urged the
wholesale overruling of the Court’s cases protecting substantive
rights under the Due Process Clause. Instead, he has insisted that
the Court can protect unenumerated rights only when a “relevant
tradition,” defined at the “most specific level,” protecting the right
“can be identified.”208 For Justice Scalia, then, judges interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment should seek the original meaning at
the lowest possible level of generality. Under this approach,
women do not enjoy a constitutional right to obtain an abortion,
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
BORK, supra note 12, at 166.
203 Id.
204 See id. at 180–85.
205 Bork, supra note 98, at 8 (“Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the
value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any
other.”).
206 See BERGER, supra note 12, at 1 (“The Fourteenth Amendment is the case study par
excellence of . . . the Supreme Court’s . . . continuing revision of the Constitution under the
guise of interpretation.”); see also id. at 116–31 (rejecting the “ ‘Open-Ended’ Phraseology
Theory” of constitutional interpretation).
207 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
208 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.7 (1989).
201
202

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/27/17 1:54 PM

ORIGINALISM AND LEVEL OF GENERALITY

45

because “(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and
(2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted
it to be legally proscribed.”209
Similarly, on this view, the
Constitution does not protect a fundamental right of same-sex
couples to marry, because it is not plausible—indeed, it is, as
Justice Scalia has stated, “absurd”—to suggest that the specific
right of a person to marry a person of the same gender is “deeply
rooted in this nation’s history and traditions.”210 There is little
doubt that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
understand the Amendment to protect a right of women to obtain
abortions211 or of same-sex couples to marry.212 This was, in
essence, Justice Scalia’s approach in Obergefell.213
But we might arrive at a very different set of conclusions both
about the Constitution’s protection for unenumerated rights—
including the right to marry, and the derivative right to marry a
person of the same sex—if we follow the approach that Bork and
others have used to justify Brown (and Loving and the Court’s sexdiscrimination cases) on originalist grounds.
That is, if
originalism permits us to depart from the specific, subjective
understandings and expectations of the framers and instead to
seek the broad principle embodied in the text, and then to apply
that principle to new circumstances not within the contemplation
209 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
210 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
211 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There
apparently was no question concerning the validity of [state bans on abortion] when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The only conclusion possible from this history is that
the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States
the power to legislate with respect to this matter.”).
212 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would have been hard at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to find Americans who did
not take the traditional view [of marriage] for granted.”).
213 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When it
comes to determining the meaning of a vague constitutional provision—such as ‘due process
of law’ or ‘equal protection of the laws’—it is unquestionable that the People who ratified
that provision did not understand it to prohibit a practice that remained both universal and
uncontroversial in the years after ratification.”); see also id. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State
throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional,
biologically rooted way.”).
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of the framers, then we can construct a plausible originalist
justification for the existence of a wide range of unenumerated
rights.214 The assertion that the framers could not have intended
for unelected judges to give content to vague rights-granting
provisions—“itself a contested twentieth-century projection rather
than a supported and historically contextualized assertion”215—
would no longer be dispositive. Instead, the crucial fact would be
that the Constitution seems fairly clearly to acknowledge (in the
Ninth Amendment) the existence of unenumerated rights216 and
includes provisions such as the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment that, objectively speaking, are written
at such a high level of generality as necessarily to include within
their scope a variety of unspecified rights.217
Nor would the faithful originalist need to confine that category
of rights to rights with historical roots dating back to the framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because (again) we no longer need
to ascertain original meaning by seeking to determine how the
framers would personally have answered the narrow question at
issue. And, in fact, there is evidence that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment drafted it “at a higher level of abstraction
or generality—that of natural liberty rights—than any specific list
of liberties and deliberately so,” precisely because the framers
214 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 609 (“[N]ew originalism open[s] up space for
originalists to reconsider the meaning of . . . rights-oriented aspects of the
Constitution . . . .”). Although no one would accuse Justice Kennedy of taking an originalist
approach in his opinion for the Court in Obergefell, see 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The generations
that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume
to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning.”), his approach arguably was consistent with Bork’s approach to Brown, at least
in its treatment of Loving and other cases that involved the right to marry, see id. at 2602
(“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right
of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child
support duties to marry.’ Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant
class from the right.”).
215 Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 166.
216 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
217 See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099504, at *8–21
(summarizing research about the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
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understood that it would be impossible and unwise to list all of the
fundamental rights with which the government might someday
interfere.218
Just as some originalists read the Fourteenth
Amendment’s anti-discrimination principle to prohibit forms of
discrimination that the framers of the Amendment believed would
be left untouched, originalists can read the Amendment’s
protection for fundamental rights to accommodate evolving
conceptions of rights. On this view, there is an originalist
justification for the Court’s conclusion in Obergefell that the states
cannot interfere with an individual’s right to marry a person of the
same sex.219
And, indeed, some originalists have already begun the project of
supplying originalist justifications for interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment (and the Ninth Amendment) to protect a wide range
of rights beyond marriage. Randy Barnett, for example, has
carefully developed and supported the argument that originalism
requires judges to protect unenumerated rights, including
economic rights such as the freedom of contract.220 Barnett’s
approach is based on the premise that the proper object in
constitutional interpretation is to determine the “objective
meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used”
in the text, rather than “how the relevant generation of ratifiers
expected or intended their textual handiwork would be applied to
specific cases.”221
In addition, because the rights-granting
provisions of the Constitution are objectively framed at a high
level of generality, Barnett argues that originalism properly
understood requires us to seek the meaning of those provisions at
that high level of generality, and then to endeavor to apply it to
modern circumstances.222 This is, in effect, the approach that Bork
BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 258.
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that
right and that liberty.”).
220 See BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 255–69 (providing an originalist
justification for judicial protection of certain unenumerated rights); see also Colby & Smith,
supra note 14, at 527 (“[Originalism] has now evolved to the point where it can plausibly
accommodate claims that the Constitution protects economic liberty.”) .
221 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 92–93.
222 See id. at 119–20.
218
219
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proposed to justify Brown on originalist grounds. Jack Balkin has
followed a similar approach in offering an originalist justification
for the right to an abortion.223
IV. ORIGINALISM AND LEVEL OF GENERALITY
What accounts for this staggering range of conclusions by
originalists about how to choose a level of generality at which to
seek the original meaning? Part of the answer lies in the evolution
of originalist thought itself. As noted earlier, the old originalism
sought principally to effectuate a limited vision of the judicial role,
a goal best achieved by limiting the range of constitutional rights
on which judges can rely to invalidate popular decision making.
Accordingly, the old originalism sought the original intent at the
most specific level of generality.224
But the limits of this
approach—including its inability to justify foundational cases such
as Brown and Loving—led originalists to modify their approach.225
Many new originalists—in particular, academic new
originalists—have taken a different approach to selecting the level
of generality at which to seek the original meaning. They have
generally concluded that the “level of generality at which terms
were defined is not an a priori theoretical question but a
contextualized historical one.”226 Accordingly, as Randy Barnett
has explained, “part of finding original meaning is determining the
level of generality with which a particular term was used.”227
Consistent with the focus on objective original meaning, Barnett
has argued that the originalist should “identify the level of

223 See BALKIN, supra note 105, at 214–19; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) (developing an originalist argument for a
constitutional right to abortion).
224 See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text; see also ); Brest, Misconceived Quest,
supra note 18, at 204–05 (distinguishing between “strict” and “moderate” originalism); Cass
R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312–13 (1996)
(distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” originalism).
225 See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
226 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 187 (1999).
227 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 120.
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generality in which the Constitution is objectively expressed.”228
The natural consequence of such an approach—which recognizes
that “[t]he proper level of generality for the constitutional
principles in the text is the one we find in the text itself”229—is
that we should seek the meaning of most of the Constitution’s
rights-granting provisions at a high level of generality. Indeed,
because those provisions were “deliberately” framed at a high level
of abstraction,230 their text might even “point to the possibility of
new principles,” and thus new rights.231
Professions of fidelity to this approach to determining the
proper level of generality are not unique to a small cadre of new
originalists intent on unsettling the conventional understanding of
what originalism entails. Michael McConnell, for example, argued
in 1997 that originalists should seek the original meaning at “the
level of generality at which the particular language was
understood by its Framers.”232 And even Robert Bork, who at one
time was in the vanguard of the old originalism, eventually came
to the view that part of the originalist’s task in ascertaining the
original meaning of the text is to find “its degree of generality,
which is part of its meaning,” and then to “apply that text to a
particular situation.”233 In seeking to interpret the “broadly
stated” rights-granting provisions, Bork asserted, the “judge
should state the principle at the level of generality that the text
and historical evidence warrant.”234
228 Barnett, Infidelity, supra note 29, at 23; see also Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 359
(“Thus the question becomes the level of generality the ratifiers and other sophisticated
political actors at the time would have imputed to the text.”).
229 BALKIN, supra note 105, at 263.
230 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 258.
231 BALKIN, supra note 105, at 266.
232 McConnell, supra note 29, at 1280.
233 BORK, supra note 12, at 149.
234 Id.
Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 672–73 (2009) (noting that some provisions of the
Constitution “employ standards and not rules,” and arguing that “[i]t is not an adequate
answer in these situations to say, as Justice Scalia sometimes did, that originalist judges
ought not to enforce Clauses of this kind because they do not lend themselves to principled
judicial application”). But see McGinnis & Rappaport, Abstract Meaning, supra note 32, at
741 (criticizing new originalists for assuming that broad language should be understood at a
high level of generality rather than pursuing other, equally plausible (and more narrow)
ways of reading the language).
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Given the examples discussed above, one can be forgiven for
wondering whether this approach has been consistently and
conscientiously followed in practice; it is far from clear that the
variation in the level of generality at which originalists seek
constitutional meaning can be explained solely by reference to the
level of abstraction at which the constitutional text is expressed. I
will have more to say about this problem shortly, but even
assuming consistent adherence to this approach, it creates the
very problem that the old originalism was designed to address.
The old originalism was concerned with both judicial restraint
and judicial constraint.235 The “primary commitment” of the old
originalism was to the former, in that “originalism was married to
a requirement of judicial deference to legislative majorities.”236 As
Lino Graglia argued, the old originalism was designed to
“minimize the conflict between judicial review and democracy” by
generally “permit[ting] the results of the democratic political
process to stand.”237 If judges may invalidate democratic action
only when required by the specific “principles actually laid down in
the historic Constitution,” then there will be fewer occasions for
the exercise of judicial review and correspondingly more space for
the operation of ordinary majoritarian decision making.238
As noted above, the new originalism is self-consciously less
concerned with restraint than was the old originalism.
If
“originalism is warranted as a theory of interpretation—that is, as
235 See Colby & Smith, supra note 14, at 583 (“[T]he old originalism was at its core deeply
concerned with both judicial constraint—narrowing the discretion of judges—and judicial
restraint—deferring to democratic majorities.”).
236 Whittington, supra note 10, at 602; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival
of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 632 (1990)
(“[T]he appeal to democratic theory only makes sense if originalism is combined with a
general preference for judicial restraint.”).
237 Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019,
1026 (1992).
238 BORK, supra note 12, at 163; accord Bork, supra note 98, at 10–11 (stating that courts
should adhere to legislative value choices); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 4
(“[J]udicial review is legitimate only when courts adhere strictly to the text of the
Constitution.”). The old originalism was primarily a response to the perceived excesses of
the Warren Court. See Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (stating that “originalism was
largely developed as a model of criticism of” the actions of the Warren and Burger Courts).
See generally Colby & Smith, Lochner, supra note 14 (discussing the evolution of legal
movements).
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a method of determining the meaning of the words written in the
Constitution”239—then fidelity to the original meaning of the text,
rather than judicial restraint, must be the operative principle. To
the new originalist, “a commitment to originalism is distinct from
a commitment to judicial deference,” and originalism “may often
require the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order
to keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding.”240
When those commitments are phrased at a high level of generality,
fidelity to the text might require giving them a broad sweep and
application, even if this results in a greater potential for displacing
majoritarian decision making. To the new originalist, this is
simply the price of fidelity to the Constitution, which (after all)
would be largely unnecessary if we were convinced that
majoritarian decision-making should always prevail.
But proponents of the old originalism were also concerned with
judicial constraint—that is, with narrowing the discretion of
judges to rely on subjective value judgments in deciding
constitutional questions.241 As Robert Bork argued, “The only way
in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges
interpret the document’s words according to the intentions of those
who drafted, proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various
amendments.”242 On this view, originalism is constraining because
it supplies a “historical criterion that is conceptually quite
separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”243
Although the new originalism has more or less abandoned its
predecessor’s devotion to judicial restraint, it has largely
maintained its professed commitment to judicial constraint, albeit

239 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101, 108 (2001).
240 Whittington, supra note 10, at 609.
241 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
242 Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 823, 826 (1986).
243 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989); accord
BERGER, supra note 12, at 284–86 (arguing that reliance on original intent forecloses
judicial value choices); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 106
(1989) (“A central concern of originalism is that judges be constrained by the law rather
than be left free to act according to their own [interests].”).
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with less certainty than did proponents of the old originalism.244
The new originalists’ claim is, essentially, that judges applying the
approach are “constrained by their obligation to remain faithful to
the original meaning,”245 which requires a historical inquiry rather
than an unguided exploration of morality and social policy. At a
minimum, then, new originalists contend that “although their
theory does not completely eliminate judicial subjectivity and the
potential for judicial mischief, it is still meaningfully constraining,
at least in comparison to the alternatives.”246
Tom Colby has demonstrated why new originalists’ claims
about constraint are unconvincing.247 As should be apparent from
the examples discussed above, the new originalism’s willingness to
seek the original meaning at a high level of abstraction inevitably
leaves considerable room for judicial creativity, and thus holds less
promise for judicial constraint.
Indeed, many new originalists have conceded that originalism
alone often is not sufficient to resolve constitutional cases
involving provisions that are couched in abstract terms and that
lack clear, rule-like commands. Once one acknowledges that the
original meaning of abstractly phrased provisions should be
ascertained at a correspondingly high level of abstraction, it
becomes inevitable that the original meaning of some of those
provisions will be “underdeterminate.”248 In some cases, “the
principle established by the text may be unclear;” in others, the
text might “specify a principle that is itself identifiable,” but the
principle might be “indeterminate in its application to a particular
situation.”249
Either way, “[t]raditional tools of interpretive
analysis can be exhausted without providing a constitutional

244 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 608–09 (noting that “there seems to be less
emphasis on the capacity of originalism to limit the discretion of the judge,” and that the
“new originalist . . . is unlikely to argue that only originalist methodology can prevent
judicial abuses or can eliminate the need for judicial judgment”).
245 Colby, supra note 18, at 751.
246 Id.
247 See id. at 751–756 (“How can a theory that interprets the most contentious
constitutional clauses at a very high level of abstraction claim to be any more constraining
than other methods of constitutional interpretation?”).
248 Barnett, supra note 239, at 108.
249 WHITTINGTON, supra note 32, at 8.
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meaning that is sufficiently clear to guide government action.”250
In such cases, the act of interpretation—that is, of discerning “the
communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional
text”251—“runs out,” and we must instead turn to the process of
“construction” to formulate rules and standards to apply the
abstract principles in the text to concrete cases.252 Constitutional
construction thus seeks to produce constitutional law that is
“consistent with [the] original meaning but not deducible from
it.”253 As should be clear from this account of the relationship
between interpretation and construction, the new originalism
leaves significant discretion to judges charged with deciding
constitutional cases.254
We might ask, moreover, whether originalism has actually been
constraining in practice, once the interpreter is willing to seek the
original meaning at a level of generality higher than the level at
which Raoul Berger would have sought it. The examples above
suggest that the selection of the level of generality provides a
substantial amount of room for an originalist to profess fidelity to
the original meaning while ensuring desired outcomes. But the
problem is not simply that some originalists are more willing than
others to seek the original meaning at a higher level of generality.
The problem is that many originalists seem to vary the level of
generality at which they seek meaning, from constitutional
provision to provision or issue to issue, in ways that cannot be
explained by simple reference to the level of generality at which
the text is expressed.
We have already seen that Robert Bork, a founding father of the
modern originalist movement, sought the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause at a much higher level of generality, in
seeking to justify Brown, than he sought the original meaning of
Id.
Solum, Construction, supra note 32, at 457.
252 Solum, supra note 26, at 20.
253 BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 121; see also Colby, supra note 18, at 734
(“There can be no originalist answer to the question of which construction to apply; by
definition, construction supplements interpretation and cannot be dictated by it.”).
254 See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 151 (2013) (arguing that “[c]onstructionist originalism is likely to reach
inconsistent and ad hoc results”).
250
251
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a potential source of a range
of individual rights, even though both are objectively expressed at
a high level of generality.255 Bork was also sometimes willing to
interpret the First Amendment at a relatively high level of
generality, at least in determining its application to suits for libel.
In Ollman v. Evans, an en banc case decided when Bork was a
judge on the D.C. Circuit, Bork acknowledged that “[w]e know very
little of the precise intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the
speech and press clauses of the first amendment.”256 But, he
continued, “we do know that they gave into our keeping the value
of preserving free expression and, in particular, the preservation of
political expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at
the core of those clauses.”257 Accordingly, even though “the
framers” might not have “envision[ed] libel actions as a major
threat to that freedom,” judges should “adapt their doctrines” over
time if the “libel action becomes a threat to the central meaning of
the first amendment. . . .”258
Yet when the question was the scope of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, he sought the original meaning at
a much lower level of generality. He asserted that “[a]s an original
matter, the clause might have extended no further than a
prohibition against the government’s recognition of an official
church or the favoring of some religions over others.”259 He then
relied on the expectations of the framers about how the clause
would apply, reasoning that the first Congress, “many of whose
members were also members of the Philadelphia convention or of
the various state ratifying conventions, and hence aware of what
the clause was intended to mean, adopted legislation that
demonstrated that they did not think the ‘wall of separation
between church and state . . . was as severe and complete as the
Court has now made it.”260 On this basis, he criticized most of the
See supra notes 93–99, 137–138 and accompanying text.
750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
257 Id.
258 Id.
See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and
Constitutional Change: An Essay on Ollman v. Evans, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155
(2013) (discussing Bork’s concurrence in Ollman).
259 BORK, supra note 12, at 95.
260 Id.
255
256
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Court’s modern cases interpreting the Establishment Clause, and
in particular, cases prohibiting prayer in schools.261
Justice Scalia, another founding father of the modern
originalist movement—and who ushered in the new originalism by
leading the “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of
Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”262—similarly
varied the level of generality at which he sought the meaning of
the constitutional text. Justice Scalia sometimes sought the
original meaning at a high level of generality. As with many other
originalists today, Justice Scalia suggested that Brown was
consistent with the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause. In a book with Bryan Garner, for example, he asserted
that the text of the Equal Protection Clause “can reasonably be
thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert the separateness
and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to treat
the races equally.”263 To be sure, as noted above Brown is an
unusual (and fraught) example; but Justice Scalia was willing to
seek the original meaning at a level of abstraction higher than
that warranted by the specific understanding and expectations of
the framers in other contexts, as well.
For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,264 Justice Scalia wrote separately to take issue with
Justice Stevens’s account of the framers’ view of corporate
speech.265 Rather than focus on the framers’ specific view of the
261 See id. (“The Court has adopted a rigidly secularist view of the establishment
clause . . . .”).
262 Antonin Scalia, Address by Justice Antonin Scalia in Washington, D.C. (June 14,
1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 6.
263 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 101, at 88. Justice Scalia has declared, however, that he
would limit the reach of the equality mandate to laws that discriminate on the basis of race.
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (announcing that he
will apply the “permissive McCulloch standard” for Congress’s power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment only “to congressional measures designed to remedy racial
discrimination by the States,” not other forms of discrimination). But he still argued that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited segregated schools even though the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not expect it to do so. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 168, at 38 (responding to a lawyer who asked, “When did it become unconstitutional to
assign children to separate schools?” by stating, “It’s an easy question, I think, for that one.
At the time that the Equal Protection Clause was adopted. That’s absolutely true.”).
264 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
265 See id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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right of corporations to engage in speech—or whether corporate
speech was originally understood to count as “speech” within the
meaning of the Amendment—Justice Scalia focused on the fact
that the constitutional text “makes no distinction between types of
speakers.”266 Because the “Amendment is written in terms of
‘speech,’ not speakers,” Justice Scalia reasoned that its “text offers
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker,” including
“incorporated associations of individuals.”267
Justice Scalia
conceded that the framers’ views about corporations might be
relevant “insofar as it can be thought to be reflected in the
understood meaning of the text they enacted,” but he did not
(unlike Justice Stevens) engage in any historical inquiry beyond
focusing on the word “speech” to determine that “understood
meaning.”268 In other words, Justice Scalia eschewed the framers’
specific understanding of and expectation about how corporate
speech would be treated under the First Amendment, focusing
instead on the broad sweep of the word “speech.”
Justice Scalia was also willing to apply the constitutional text
to technologies and media that did not exist at the time of the
adoption of the relevant provision. For example, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
protects violent video games from content-based regulation,269 and
that the Fourth Amendment limits the use of thermal-imaging
technology outside of a home.270 This approach necessarily entails
interpretation at something other than the lowest possible level of
generality, because it presupposes that some broader principle
that underlies the text—in the case of the Free Speech clause, that
protected speech “communicate[s] ideas,”271 and in the case of the
Id. at 386.
Id. at 392–93.
268 Id. at 386.
269 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 5644 S. Ct. 786, 790 (2011) (Scalia, J.) (reasoning that
“ ‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s
command, do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears”).
270 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (“It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advance of technology . . . . To withdraw protection of this
minimum expectation [of privacy in the home] would be to permit police technology to erode
the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”).
271 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 790.
266
267
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Fourth Amendment, that a search is government action that
interferes with “the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”272—
should be applied in ways that the framers of the text could not
have anticipated or foreseen.
Justice Scalia sought the original meaning at an even higher
level of generality when addressing the constitutionality of official
race-conscious affirmative action programs.273 In concluding that
such programs violate the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Scalia
relied on the fact that the conventional justification for such
programs—to remedy the effects of non-specific past societal
discrimination—“is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the
individual,” a focus that Justice Scalia substantiated by invoking
the Equal Protection Clause’s explicit protection for “person[s],”
rather than groups.274 Justice Scalia reached this conclusion even
though there is ample historical evidence that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to prohibit raceconscious measures to address the effects of past discrimination.275
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 356 (“In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Justice
Scalia . . . . treated the Equal Protection Clause as the source of a simple but exceedingly
general rule . . . .”).
274 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia did not provide an originalist defense
for why this principle—phrased as it is at a high level of generality—applies to raceconscious actions by the federal government. Indeed, if it is difficult to construct an
originalist argument for Brown v. Board of Education, it is close to impossible to construct
one for Bolling v. Sharpe. See 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government.”).
275 For example, in 1866, the Thirty-Ninth Congress—the same Congress that drafted and
passed the Fourteenth Amendment—passed a statute authorizing the Freedmen’s Bureau
(which was created to help freed slaves) to provide special assistance to African Americans
that would not be available to white citizens. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3842–50
(1866) (Senate vote); id. at 3850 (House vote). The following year, the Fortieth Congress—
the same Congress that imposed Reconstruction to force the southern states to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment—enacted a statute providing money for “destitute colored persons”
in Washington, D.C. Resolution of March 16, 1867, 15 Stat. 20. And in the years after the
Civil War, Congress enacted many other appropriations for “colored” soldiers and sailors of
the Union Army. All of these programs were open only to African Americans—even African
Americans who had not been slaves—and were adopted over objections from opponents that
such racially exclusive measures were unfair to poor whites and were thus racially
272
273
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This refusal to be bound by the specific expectations of the
framers is perhaps not surprising, given Justice Scalia’s repeated
assertion that the original meaning of the text, rather than the
subjective intentions of the framers, should control. Indeed,
Justice Scalia argued that the specific expectations of the framers
about how the constitutional text would apply are not the
appropriate interpretive object in the search for original meaning.
In a colloquy with Ronald Dworkin about constitutional
interpretation, Justice Scalia declared that he follows “what the
text would reasonably be understood to mean,” rather than the
“concrete expectations of lawgivers.”276
Of course, even taking Justice Scalia at his word, it is not at all
clear that in practice there is a meaningful difference between
original-meaning originalism, on the one hand, and original-intent
or original-expected-application originalism, on the other, at least
when one does not seek the former at a high level of generality. To
be sure, many originalists have dedicated significant time and
effort to the task of demonstrating that, as a matter of theory, we
ought to seek the original meaning and not the original intent or
the framers’ subjective expectations about how the text would
apply.277
But whatever one can say about the theoretical
differences between the varying objects of originalist
interpretation, in practice the inquiry to determine the objective
original meaning inevitably will turn, at least in part, on the same
types of evidence that are relevant to demonstrating the framers’

discriminatory. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (discussing “social welfare
programs” during reconstruction).
276 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 144 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
277 See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 249–55. These efforts arose, at least initially, in
response to devastating critiques by Jeff Powell and Paul Brest, among others, to originalintent originalism. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. Later, arguments in
favor of original-meaning originalism over original-intent or original-expected-applications
originalism became part of a more general project of justifying originalism as an
interpretive, rather than a normative, theory. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 25, at 1834
(“Interpretation must precede evaluation, rather than vice versa. The Constitution’s merit
as a constitution depends on its meaning, and one should not prejudge that question by
allowing preconceptions about merit to affect the interpretative enterprise.”).
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original intentions or expectations about how the text should
apply.278
Justice Scalia, for example, declared that he looks to The
Federalist and writings by other participants in the framing “not
because they were Framers and therefore their intent is
authoritative and must be the law; but rather because their
writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the
time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally
understood.”279 I am willing to take at face value Justice Scalia’s
explanation for why he relied on such materials, but one cannot
avoid noting that someone seeking the original intent or original
expected application likely would rely on the very same materials.
Evidence of original intent and original expected applications, in
other words, is also (generally speaking) evidence of how the
constitutional text would have been understood by the
hypothetical reasonable person,280 and thus its objective original
meaning.281
But even assuming that there is a meaningful difference
between an inquiry seeking the original objective public meaning
(at a relatively specific level of generality) and one seeking the
original expected application of the text, Justice Scalia did not
consistently eschew the latter. I have already described Justice
Scalia’s view that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee
a right of same-sex couples to marry, because in 1868 “no one
278 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683,
1686, 1689–1701 (2012) (noting that despite the rise of original-meaning originalism, the
founders’ intentions continue to be relevant to modern constitutional theorists).
279 Scalia, supra note 276, at 38.
280 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 48–49 (2006) (“[T]he weight of originalist opinion today supports the view
that the Constitution’s meaning is to be found in the hypothetical mind of the reasonable
person . . . .”).
281 See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 60–68 (relying heavily on statements
of members of the Reconstruction Congress in seeking to ascertain the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1133
(2003) (examining the role of records from the Constitutional Convention in interpreting the
Constitution, and concluding that they provide “rich insight into original linguistic
meaning”); McConnell, supra note 43, at 957–1093 (relying on statements of members of
Congress in the 1860s and 1870s to ascertain the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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doubted the constitutionality” of laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples;282 and his view that discrimination on the
basis of gender should not, as an original matter, give rise to any
special concern under the Equal Protection Clause, because
“nobody ever thought that that’s what it meant.”283 Justice Scalia
also relied on the framers’ expectations in concluding that capital
punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments.284 He acknowledged that the
Amendment enacts “an abstract principle,” because (as in the case
of the First and Fourth Amendments) it must be capable of
application “to all sorts of torture quite unknown at the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted.”285 But he then asserted that
the principle that it “abstracts” is the founding “society’s
assessment of what is cruel,” and thus is “rooted in the moral
perceptions of the time.”286 As such, “capital punishment, which
was widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral
principle of the Eighth Amendment.”287
For Justice Scalia,
“provision for the death penalty [in the Fifth Amendment’s
reference to “capital” crimes] in a Constitution that sets forth the
moral principle of ‘no cruel punishments’ ” was “conclusive
evidence that the death penalty is not (in the moral view of the
Constitution) cruel.”288
In other words, because the framers of the Eighth Amendment
did not believe that capital punishment was cruel and unusual
punishment, it cannot (for constitutional purposes) be considered
cruel and unusual today.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s
ostensible rejection of the “concrete expectations of [the framers]”
as the appropriate guide for the original meaning,289 he relied
explicitly and dispositively on those expectations in assessing the
constitutionality of capital punishment. This is in stark contrast
to his apparent view that practices that the framers of the
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Scalia, supra note 276, at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 144.
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Fourteenth Amendment believed were permissible—such as
segregated schools and race-conscious remedial legislation—are
now unconstitutional because the abstract principle that animates
the text applies differently now than it would have then.
Justice Scalia was not alone among the Justices in shifting the
level of generality at which he sought constitutional meaning.
Justice Thomas has also implicitly contended that Brown was
consistent with—indeed, required by—the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment,290 and that race-conscious programs
designed to benefit racial minorities are inconsistent with the
Amendment’s original meaning.291 Like Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas has apparently been willing to seek the original meaning
for resolving those questions at a high level of generality,
reasoning that the “Constitution enshrines principles independent
of social theories.”292 He has also taken a broad view of the First
Amendment’s protection for commercial speech, concluding
(notwithstanding the conventional view that the framers did not
believe that the Amendment protected commercial speech)293 that
he does “not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting
that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’
speech.”294
290 Justice Thomas suggested in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
distinguish between “measures to keep the races together” and “measures to keep the races
apart,” and that the “Constitution is not [so] malleable” as to permit the
constitutionalization of “today’s faddish social theories that embrace that distinction.” 551
U.S. 701, 780 (2007) (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas then cited Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), to support
the assertion that the “Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories.”
Id.
291 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2428 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The Equal Protection Clause strips States of all authority to use race as a
factor in providing education.”).
292 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 780 (Thomas, J., concurring).
293 See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 248 (1963) (“[W]e do not know what the First Amendment’s freedom of speech-andpress clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it at the time they do so. Moreover,
they themselves . . . possessed no clear understanding either.”); Bork, supra note 98, at 22
(“The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have
been overly concerned with the subject.”).
294 44 Liquormart, Inc. v Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas somewhat tentatively noted that “some historical materials suggest”
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But Justice Thomas has sought the original meaning of the
First Amendment at a much lower level of generality in seeking to
determine whether state regulation of the sale of violent video
games to minors interferes with the freedom of speech. In Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,295 he concluded that “[t]he
practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that ‘the
freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not include a
right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech)
without going through the minors’ parents or guardians.”296 He
relied on historical evidence that, in his view, demonstrated that
“the founding generation believed parents had absolute authority
over their minor children and expected parents to use that
authority to direct the proper development of their children.”297
Justice Thomas concluded that it “would be absurd to suggest that
such a society understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include a right
to speak to minors (or a corresponding right of minors to access
speech) without going through the minors’ parents.”298 According
to this reasoning, the First Amendment does not provide
commercial speech has the same status under the Amendment as other speech, and he cited
three cases and a statement by Benjamin Franklin to support that position. Id.
Justice Thomas also tentatively suggested, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742 (2010), that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might
protect unenumerated rights. See id. at 854 (“The mere fact that the [Privileges or
Immunities] Clause does not expressly list the rights it protects does not render it incapable
of principled judicial application.”). Although he conceded that this possibility “may
produce hard questions,” he noted that the “Constitution contains many provisions that
require an examination of more than just constitutional text to determine whether a
particular act is within Congress’ power or is otherwise prohibited,” and he reasoned that
“[w]hen the inquiry focuses on what the ratifying era understood the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to mean, interpreting it should be no more ‘hazardous’ than interpreting
these other constitutional provisions by using the same approach.” Id. It is not entirely
clear from Justice Thomas’s opinion, but it seems likely that he was suggesting that an
unenumerated right would have to have been specifically recognized at the time of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a fundamental right in order to be entitled to
protection today under the Clause. Cf. id. at 858 (concluding that “the record makes plain
that the Framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the ratifying-era
public . . . . deemed [the right to keep and bear arms] necessary to include in the minimum
baseline of federal rights that the Privileges or Immunities Clause established in the wake
of the War over slavery”).
295 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
296 Id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 2752.
298 Id.
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protection today for activity that the “founding generation would
not have considered [to be] an abridgment of ‘the freedom of
speech.’ ”299
Justice Thomas took a similar approach to the constitutionality
under the Due Process Clause of bans on same-sex marriage. He
sought to answer the question by assigning a narrow meaning to
the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clauses. He contended that
“[s]ince well before 1787, liberty has been understood as freedom
from government action, not entitlement to government benefits,”
and that the “Framers created our Constitution to preserve that
understanding of liberty.”300 In his view, the term “liberty” most
likely referred “only to freedom from physical restraint,”301 and at
most meant “individual freedom from governmental action, not as
a right to a particular governmental entitlement.”302 Because a
state’s refusal to acknowledge a marriage does not involve any
restraint on private action, Justice Thomas reasoned, such action
by the state does not impermissibly interfere with the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.303
Similarly, Justice Thomas has sought the original meaning of
the Commerce Clause at a low level of generality. In his
concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez,304 he urged the Court
to consider an approach “more faithful to the original
understanding” of the Clause.305 He stressed that “at the time the
original Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling,
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these
purposes,”306 and he warned that “interjecting a modern sense of
commerce into the Constitution generates significant textual and
structural problems.”307 Because the “Founding Fathers confirmed
that most areas of life (even many matters that would have
substantial effects on commerce) would remain outside the reach

299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Id.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2633.
Id. at 2634 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 2635–37.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 585.
Id. at 587.
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of the Federal Government,”308 we should understand such
matters to be outside of the reach of the commerce power today.309
When the question is the scope of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, in other words, Justice Thomas does not seek
the principle that underlies the term “commerce” and then
endeavor to apply it to modern circumstances; he seeks both the
framers’ definition of the term and their understanding of how it
would apply, notwithstanding changes that they could not have
foreseen.
Other prominent originalists have also varied the level of
generality at which they seek the original meaning in ways that
cannot obviously be explained by the level of generality at which
the constitutional text is expressed. For example, as discussed
above, Steven Calabresi has sought the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment at a high level of generality when
considering the Amendment’s treatment of discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation and the Amendment’s
protection for the right to marry.310 Indeed, he went so far as to
describe as “faux originalists” those originalists who believe that
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
does
not
prohibit
sex
discrimination,311 presumably because they improperly read the
Amendment at too narrow a level of generality. But when the
question is the regulation of abortion—a matter on which he has
confessed to holding very strong views312—he seeks constitutional
meaning at a much lower level of generality. Rather than ask, for
example, whether the Fourteenth Amendment, through its
protection for fundamental rights,313 embraces a right to decide
when or whether to start a family, Calabresi asks whether a right
to “abortion on demand” is either “deeply rooted in history and
Id. at 590.
See id. at 593 (declaring that we must “respect a constitutional line that does not grant
Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce”).
310 See supra notes 115–121, 147–164, 169 and accompanying text.
311 See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 151, at 101.
312 See Steven G. Calabresi, How To Reverse Government Imposition of Immorality: A
Strategy for Eroding Roe v. Wade, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 85 (2008) (describing
abortion as a “loathsome procedure” and stating that “Roe v. Wade was “not merely wrongly
decided,” but “also profoundly immoral”).
313 See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 115, at 1413–20 (analyzing the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause).
308
309
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tradition” or supported by enough states today to constitute an
“Article V consensus of three-quarters of the States.”314 Similarly,
whereas Randy Barnett seeks the original meaning of the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment at a sufficiently high level of generality to
authorize judges to “supplement” the text by recognizing rights
entitled to protection315— including the right of same-sex partners
to engage in consensual sex at home316 and the freedom of
contract317—he has, like Justice Thomas, sought the original
meaning of the Commerce Clause at a much lower level of
generality.318
So much for the constraining power of originalism. We can
produce radically different answers to questions of constitutional
law simply by modifying the level of generality at which we ask
the questions. If originalists continue to coalesce around the
principles of the new originalism, then originalism’s capacity to
constrain will continue to diminish—and, conversely, originalism’s
capacity to generate a wide range of plausible answers to
questions of constitutional law will continue to increase.319
Perhaps more important, the growing tendency of originalists to
seek the original meaning at a high level of generality is tending
(presumably much to the chagrin of those who were in the
vanguard of the old originalism in the 1970s and 1980s) to collapse
the distinction between originalism and non-originalism. This is
not necessarily a bad thing as a matter of theory, but it might have
distorting effects for our constitutional culture.
Non-originalism obviously is not one cohesive theory, but rather
a collection of theories that reject the assertion that we must
Calabresi, Equal Justice, supra note 99, at 154.
BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 123.
316 See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 495 (2004) (“By the theory of the police power presented here, Lawrence v. Texas,
is . . . easy case.”).
317 See BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 211–19.
318 See id. at 278–318; Barnett, supra note 239, at 146 (“The most persuasive evidence of
original meaning . . . strongly supports . . . [a] narrow interpretation of Congress’
[Commerce Clause] power . . . .”).
319 See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 300 (“[T]he wide range of competing versions of
originalism enables self-professed orginalists to reach, while applying ostensibly originalist
methodology, virtually any result that they wish to reach.”).
314
315
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always be bound by the narrow original understanding of the
constitutional
text.320
But
non-originalists—or
living
constitutionalists, as they used to be called—do not simply ignore
text and history in assigning constitutional meaning. As I have
noted elsewhere, for most non-originalists, the original meaning of
the text provides the starting point for any act of constitutional
interpretation.321
Few non-originalists, for example, would
contend that a twenty-five-year-old person is eligible to serve as
President—or, conversely, that the Constitution should be read
today to prevent anyone under the age of fifty from serving as
President.322 But because of the broad level of generality at which
much of the constitutional text is expressed, the text alone rarely
resolves constitutional questions.323
Non-originalists also
generally do not feel constrained by the specific expectations of the
framers in deciding how to apply the principle embodied in the
text to modern circumstances.
Accordingly, when Justice Brennan gave a speech in 1986 to the
Federalist Society criticizing originalism, he lamented those “who
would restrict claims of right to the values of 1789 specifically
articulated in the Constitution” and who “turn a blind eye to social
progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles to
changes of social circumstance.”324 His approach, in contrast,
accepted the framers’ “fundamental principles” but refused to be
bound by the “precise, at times anachronistic, contours” of those
principles.325 To Justice Brennan, recognizing that “the genius of
the Constitution” lies in “the adaptability of its great principles to
320 See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (defining
non-originalism as the “thesis that facts that occur after ratification or amendment can
properly bear—constitutively, not just evidentially—on how courts should interpret the
Constitution . . .”).
321 See Smith, supra note 34, at 723 (noting that originalists use the original meaning as
“the starting point” for interpretation).
322 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (providing that no person shall “be eligible to the
Office of President . . . who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years . . .”).
323 See Smith, supra note 34, at 723 (“[O]riginal meaning . . . rarely alone provides the
conclusion.”).
324 William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown
University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 55–
57 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). I am indebted to my colleague Orin Kerr, who brought
this speech to my attention.
325 Id. at 61.
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cope with current problems and current needs” necessarily
entailed the rejection of originalism.326
And yet this was, essentially, Bork’s approach to the question of
racial segregation, to take the example with which we began our
discussion. Bork criticized the Court for relying on a nonoriginalist rationale in Brown,327 reasoning that the Court’s selfconscious rejection in Brown of originalism328 not only was wrong,
but also had a “calamitous effect upon the law” precisely because it
purported to depart from the original meaning.329 But even if Bork
was correct that the opinion in Brown would have gained
legitimacy by being clearly “rooted in the original
understanding,”330 it is far from clear that Bork’s approach—
which, again, focused on the demands of “equality”—was
meaningfully different from the Court’s actual approach, which
ultimately concluded that, “in . . . light of [public education’s] full
development and its present place in American life,” segregated
schools were unconstitutional because “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.”331 Indeed, as we have seen,
Bork’s approach would justify all sorts of open-ended
interpretation in the name of “equality,” including many with
which, it is safe to say, Bork would have expressed strong
disagreement.332
Yet the examples discussed above suggest that Bork’s approach
to Brown is no longer an outlier in originalist circles. If all
originalism entails today is a commitment to the ideas that
constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of ratification and

Id.
See BORK, supra note 12, at 77, 83 (stating that the Court in Brown issued “a ruling
based on nothing in the historic Constitution,” which subsequently encouraged the Court “to
embark on more adventures in policymaking, which is what it thought it had done in
Brown”).
328 347 U.S. 483, 492 (“[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”).
329 BORK, supra note 12, at 76.
330 Id. at 83.
331 Brown, 347 U.S. at 492, 495.
332 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 n.25 (1997) (“If achieving
‘equality’ is the relevant intention, it would be equally originalist to say that the Fourteenth
Amendment enacted Marxism, on the theory that equality and capitalism were mutually
inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that.”).
326
327
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that judges are bound by that meaning,333 with the recognition
that in many cases the meaning was fixed only at a very high level
of generality, then there is no longer anything particularly
distinctive about originalism.334
In a provocative paper, for example, Will Baude argues that
“originalism is our law”; but he can do so—and accommodate many
Supreme Court decisions that an earlier generation of originalists
either decried or regretfully concluded were indefensible on
originalist grounds—only because his definition of what
originalism entails is so capacious.335 Similarly, Jack Balkin has
sought expressly to merge, under the banner of “Living
Originalism,” what were once thought to be competing approaches
to interpretation.336
But it turns out that this was not a
particularly challenging move, given how much originalists have
repudiated about the old form of originalism.
It is in this light that we should understand Elena Kagan’s
comments about originalism during the hearings on her
nomination to serve as Associate Justice. When asked about the
framers, Kagan declared, “Sometimes they laid down very specific
rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles. Either way, we
apply what they tried to do.
In that way, we are all

333 See Solum, Construction, supra note 32, at 456 (describing the “Fixation Thesis” and
the “Constraint Principle” as the “two core ideas” of originalist theories).
334 See Orin Kerr, More on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/29/mor
e-on-orginalism-and-same-sex-marriage/ (“If we accept the full range of what today’s
theorists say, it no longer makes sense to ask whether there is an originalist argument for a
position. There are now originalist arguments for everything.”); Orin Kerr, Is There an
Originalist Case for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/28/is-there-an-original
ist-case-for-a-right-to-same-sex-marriage/ (nothing that to make an originalist claim
“identifiably different” from a non-originalist one, there would need to be evidence that “the
level of generality actually identified and applied” was the same as that understood by the
framers).
335 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2403 (2015)
(defining “inclusive originalism” as an approach under which “the original meaning of the
Constitution is the ultimate criterion for constitutional law,” and under which “judges can
look to precedent, policy, or practice, but only to the extent that the original meaning
incorporates or permits them”) (emphasis omitted).
336 See BALKIN, supra note 105, at 3–34.
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originalists.”337 But Justice Kagan could make this assertion in
good faith only because the version of originalism most often
advanced by scholars is slowly becoming what most of us think of
as non-originalism. Justice Kagan could just as easily have
declared, it turns out, that we are all non-originalists now.
This is not to say that the old originalists had it right. Quite to
the contrary, the old originalism suffered from very serious
problems, including the fact that it could not justify some of our
most deeply valued norms of constitutional law. But at least
under the old originalism, we usually knew (more or less) where
we stood. Under the old originalism, for example, Roe was
wrong,338 but so was Lochner.339 Under the new originalism,
perhaps both are still wrong;340 or perhaps Roe was right but
Lochner was wrong;341 or perhaps Roe was wrong but Lochner was

337 Kagan: We Are All Originalists, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (June 29, 2010),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/Kagan-we-are-all-orginalists.html.
338 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 2 (“[T]he Supreme Court
has . . . created out of whole cloth . . . a ‘right of privacy,’ a ‘right’ the Court used to
invalidate . . . the abortion laws of all 50 states.”); see also William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976) (criticizing the view under
which “nonelected members of the federal judiciary may address themselves to a social
problem simply because other branches of government have failed or refused to do so”).
339 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12, at 266 (“The logic that bars the one equally bars the
other.”); BORK, supra note 12, at 43 (“[S]ubstantive due process, wherever it appears, is
never more than a pretense that the judge’s views are in the Constitution.”); OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, supra note 185, at 59 (“To justify its promotion of a laissez-faire marketplace
[in the Lochner era], the Court purported to rely on the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, but it never seriously attempted to justify its expansive
interpretation of those clauses with their original meaning.”). This is not to say, however,
that there was not a plausible defense of Lochner under the old originalism. See, e.g.,
Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453, 454, 492–97 (1985)
(arguing that Lochner was consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
340 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 947, 952 (2008) (“The Supreme Court abandoned the Lochner-era doctrine of
economic substantive due process in the face of a withering textualist and originalist
critique . . . .”); id. at 957 (“Is it more important to the rule of law to maintain abortion
rights or more important to get rid of the doctrine of substantive due process, which led to
Dred Scott v. Sandford and to Lochner v. New York? In constitutional law, one ought to take
the long view.”).
341 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 223, at 292 (offering “an argument for the right to abortion
based on the original meaning of the constitutional text as opposed to its original expected
application”); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 679–80 (2005) (suggesting that although there is a
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right;342 or perhaps they were both right.343 All we have to do is
alter the level of generality at which we seek the original meaning,
and we can construct a plausible argument for any of those
results—or, for that matter, for almost anything.
There is an irony in this state of affairs. Modern originalism
arose in direct response to the broad rights-granting decisions of
the Warren and Burger Courts.344 “Above all, originalism was a
way of explaining what the Court had done wrong, and what it had
done wrong in this context was primarily to strike down
government actions in the name of individual rights”345—and in
particular, individual rights that were not specifically mentioned
in the text or specifically contemplated by the framers. But the
new originalism’s embrace of the practice of seeking constitutional
meaning at a high level of generality means that almost anything
goes now, even for originalists.
Yet the problem goes beyond irony. The source of originalism’s
appeal, particularly outside of the legal academy, has long been its
claim to neutrality.346 On this view, because originalism “lash[es]
judges to the solid mast of history,”347 it is “less likely to aggravate
plausible claim that Lochner was correct when it was decided, based on the intellectual
assumptions of the time, our legal culture has changed enough that it is now wrong).
342 See, e.g., Edward Whelan, Rand Paul is Wrong: Judicial Restraint is Right, NAT’L REV.
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/396480/rand-paul-wrong-judicial-rest
raint-right-ed-whelan (“The core of judicial activism consists of the wrongful overriding by
judges of democratic enactments or other policy choices made through the processes of
representative government. Roe v. Wade, with its invention of a constitutional right to
abortion, is a classic example.”); Ed Whelan, Re: Does the Constitution Protect
Unenumerated Rights?, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 18, 2012) (stating that it is “quite plausible” that
“the Privileges or Immunities Clause, properly construed, does protect some substantive,
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/296482/re-does-constitution-protect-unenume
rated-rights-ed-whelan (stating that it is “quite plausible” that “the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, properly construed, does protect some substantive economic rights”).
343 See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 31, at 259–66 (constructing an originalist
argument for a constitutionally protected “presumption of liberty” against legislative
interference); Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 411
(2007) (“I am sympathetic with [Balkin’s] conclusions about the unconstitutionality of
prohibitions on abortion.”).
344 See Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (“[O]riginalism was a reactive theory motivated
by substantive disagreement with . . . the Warren and Burger Courts. . . .”).
345 Id.
346 See McConnell, supra note 36, at 2415 (arguing that originalism is objective rather
than ideological).
347 Whittington, supra note 10, at 602.
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the most significant weakness of the system of judicial review,”
which is the risk that “the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law.”348
Approaches to constitutional
interpretation that do not tie judges to the historical meaning of
the Constitution, in contrast, simply invite judges to impose their
own policy preferences under the guise of interpretation.349 But
originalists’ increasing willingness to seek constitutional meaning
at a high level of generality largely frees judges from the
constraint of history. And, as we have seen, the freedom to vary
the level of generality while still claiming fidelity to originalism
tends to make originalism seem significantly less neutral.350
More important, although academic originalists have gone a
long way towards making originalism attractive even to those who
were deeply skeptical of the old originalism, judges remain free to
apply some version of the old originalism when they are so moved.
As Tom Colby has explained, originalists can accept some of the
new originalism’s modifications to the old originalism while
rejecting—or “more often simply not acknowledging or engaging”—
others; or worse, they can claim to accept those changes in theory,
“but then turn around and not actually employ them in
practice.”351 The examples discussed above suggest that this
happens regularly.
In addition, the popular conception of originalism remains
something much more like the old originalism.352 That conception
is based on what Larry Alexander has self-deprecatingly described

Scalia, supra note 243, at 863.
See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 36, at 286 (“Integrity characterizes a judicial process based
on originalism, and its lack is one of the chief deficiencies of its alternatives.”); id. at 288
(arguing that the “impersonality” of originalism’s decision-making criteria “invokes all the
virtues of objectivity and by implication rejects subjective judging,” and criticizing the “often
arbitrary, partisan, subjective criteria of nonoriginalists”).
350 See supra notes 244–254 and accompanying text.
351 Colby, supra note 18, at 772; see also Dorf, supra note 124, at 937–38 (“[D]espite the
shift in academic defenses of originalism, judges and others continue to invoke the older,
more simple-minded expected-applications version of originalism.”).
352 See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2022–23
(2012) (reviewing both JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)); DAVID A. STRAUSS,
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)) (“The available evidence indicates that members of the
public at large hold views about originalism, but they do not sharply distinguish among
original intent, original expected application, and original semantic meaning.”).
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as “simple-minded originalism,”353 and it derives much of its
appeal from the idea that by adhering to the specific intent of the
framers, judges can avoid “legislating from the bench.”354 To be
sure, the claim that judges who follow this approach can effectively
limit their role to that of “umpire”355 might be fanciful to most
people who are engaged with constitutional law, but it is a
metaphor with great resonance outside of our world.
Originalism acquires an additional veneer of respectability in
the popular conception when the work of new originalists
purporting to justify Brown and the Court’s decisions on sex
discrimination and the right of privacy trickles in to the public
discourse over the proper way to interpret the Constitution. But
in practice—particularly in judicial practice, with respect to new
questions that arise—judges are free to follow the more narrow,
popular conception of originalism and seek the original meaning at
a low level of generality.356 This enables originalists to continue to
claim, in public debates over how to interpret the Constitution,
that only their approach to constitutional interpretation is
genuinely neutral, while avoiding the taint that assuredly would
attach to their approach with the admission that it cannot, in fact,
justify many of our most prized norms of constitutional law.
Sooner or later, originalists will have to choose.

353 See Alexander, supra note 32, at 1 (noting that “simple-minded originalism,” which
seeks the “authors’ intended meaning,” is “considered heretical among most legal
academics” but is “so orthodox among ordinary folks as to escape notice”).
354 Whittington, supra note 10, at 601 (internal quotation marks omitted); see JOHNATHAN
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 96
(2005) (quoting President Nixon, who insisted that it was “the job of the courts to interpret
the law, not to make the law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
355 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be
C.J. of the United States).
356 See Dorf, supra note 352, at 2014 (“Widespread acceptance of Balkin’s views would
allow conservatives to say that even liberals now accept originalism but then turn around
and defined originalism narrowly.” (footnotes omitted)).

